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DIPLOMATIC SKETCHES.

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“AN OUTSIDER.”



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P R E F A C E.

It may appear out of date to call attention to the question of North Schleswig at a moment when weighty matters of apparently more immediate importance occupy the public mind ; but considering the lively interest evinced of late for ill-used races and nationalities, the author thinks it only right not to forget those who, so much nearer our shores, add to their claims by suffering in silence ; and he sincerely hopes that these pages may refresh the memory of all who believe in treaty obligations, and that they may stir up our dormant sympathies for the “harshly and unjustly” treated countrymen of our Princess, of “the Sea King’s daughter from over the sea.”

A time will come when our paramount interests will be seriously affected by the fact of Denmark’s power being crippled and maimed ; and we shall do well to remember the prophetic warnings of Mr. Disraeli,

who told us thirty years ago that the invasion of Denmark, "in this age of liberty," had no other reason but Prussia's want of coasts and her desire to become a great naval power: whilst Lord Palmerston said that the integrity and the independence of the State which commands the entrance to the Baltic were of concern to England.

Or shall it be said that the opinions of two such authorities "have gone glittering through the dream of things that were"?

LONDON, *September*, 1878.

CORRECTIONS.

Page 13, line 10, *for* "Oerstaed" *read* "Örsted."
 „ 72 „ 1, „ "Kisbek" „ "Kübek."
 „ 72 „ 17, „ „ „
 „ 72 „ 29, „ "Genty" „ "Gentž."
 „ 72 „ 34, „ „ „
 „ 83 „ 11, „ "non ut idem" „ "non est idem."
 „ 93 „ 31, „ "Fernahrn" „ "Femahrn."

DIPLOMATIC SKETCHES.

I AM sure everybody—at least all diplomatists—will agree with me that there are few posts so enviable as the post of Danish Minister at our Court. It is in itself a good fortune to represent the native country of our Princess, for no more popular Princess of Wales has ever graced these shores; but, if possible, this privilege is in the present instance enhanced by the universal sympathy of all classes in England towards gallant little Denmark,* which, although deserted by her most powerful friends in the hour of need, pluckily faced the combined forces of Prussia and Austria in an unequal struggle for what she considered her right. And well may Denmark be pardoned if she has misinterpreted or exaggerated claims openly recognised by the Great Powers in the Protocol of London,† which declared the integrity

* "Denmark has always had a particular interest with England. Our very ancestors came originally from one of its provinces." (So wrote, in 1692, the author of the animadversions on Lord Molesworth's account of Denmark.)

† Signed on May 8th, 1852.

of the Danish Monarchy a cosmopolitan necessity (*d'utilité publique et européenne*), which, in the interest of European peace, fixed the order of succession, and which created a new, and, if I may call it so, an international entail in favour of the younger branch of Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, the present royal line. Surely it was not Denmark's fault if she took the intentions of the Great Powers *au sérieux*, and if she allowed herself to see in the Protocol a good title to even those parts of the monarchy where Germany and German laws (*Deutsches Fürstenrecht*) had an undoubted claim to precedence.

Not Denmark, but those Powers are responsible, who, creating a new state of things, had not the courage of their opinions, nor the earnest will to back up their decisions when the conflict became imminent, but who left Denmark to fight single-handed the battle of the Protocol. Well may the brave little nation say, "Preserve me from my friends," whilst we must blush when we look back upon our baneful policy of non-intervention, to which the world owes to a great extent the gigantic disturbances of 1866 and 1870, and in a certain measure also the troubles of the present day, which all followed in the wake of the Danish catastrophe.

The imaginary settlement of the Danish question had the misfortune to create the very consequences against which the Protocol of 1852 had intended to guard Europe, and Lord Palmerston's prophetic words, 'that Schleswig-Holstein would be *l'allumette*

qui mettrait le feu aux quatre coins de l'Europe," have become only too true, for even the late conflagration in the East was nothing but one of the natural results of the imprudent shifting of a once well-balanced equilibrium; and we are far from having done with it yet.

However, if the misfortunes of others can sweeten one's own, Denmark must feel satisfied; for in delivering her up to the Prussian colossus, the Great Powers have sanctioned the new international law of "might is right," to which Austria, as predicted by Lord Palmerston,* the minor States of Germany, and France have already been obliged to bow in turn, and to which others will make obeisance in due time. "*Le vin est tiré, il faut le boire;*" and if the good pleasure of Prussia has been substituted for the united decisions of 1852, we have to thank the signatories, and foremost our own Government—that is the Government of those days, for having effaced itself at a moment when an earnest *veto* of England would have saved Denmark from a certain defeat, whilst it would at the same time have spared Europe the humiliation of having had her wishes disregarded, and her decrees trampled upon.

It is in no way the author's wish to examine the

° "94, Piccadilly, February 13th, 1864.

"MY DEAR RUSSELL,

"I share fully your indignation. The conduct of Austria and Prussia is discreditably bad, and one or both of them will suffer for it before these matters are settled.

• "PALMERSTON."

(E. Ashley's "Life of Viscount Palmerston," vol. ii. p. 247.)

abstract right of the Great Powers to create a new basis for the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, and to fix the order of succession as stipulated by the Protocol of May 8th, 1852. So much has been said and written on the subject,* that it is best to put the question of strict legality aside and simply to deal with the *fait accompli*, and the fact that rightly or wrongly the Great Powers took a certain decision, which they believed to be in the interest of Europe; if by so doing they have committed the possible injustice of overlooking the rights of the Duchies,† and of disregarding the claims of the Augustenburgs, and if to a certain extent they have been wanting in international courtesy towards the German Diet, is a matter of opinion, and perfectly immaterial as far as the validity of the Protocol is

* To explain the attitude of Germany, it will be well to mention the opinion of the Federal spokesman at the Conferences of 1864, who expressed himself in a despatch of December 29th, 1861, to Mr. Murray, our *Chargé d'Affaires* at Dresden, as follows: "*Cet acte (le traité de 1852) ayant pour objet d'établir un nouvel ordre de succession dans le Royaume de Danemark, a été accepté et sanctionné par le Reichstag danois. Mais pour qu'il devînt légitime et exécutoire pour les Duchés allemands, il fallait obtenir le consentement des Agnats, appelés par le droit d'hérédité à y succéder, ensuite celui des états, et enfin celui de la Confédération germanique.*"

† What these rights were we all know, but it may be of interest to quote the opinion of an Englishman, published in 1700, and of one who seems rather partial to Denmark:

"It was agreed not only betwixt the King (Christian II.) and kingdom of Denmark, and the said dukes, but also betwixt the several dukes in respect to one another (as the words of the said union in the low Saxon tongue express it in plain terms), that there should be a perpetual and inseparable union in the dutchy of Sleswick, and a communion in the dukedom of Holstein."—(Dr. Crull's "Memoirs of Denmark," 1700, p. 40.)

concerned, for no one will contest the right, one might even say the duty, of the Great Powers to subordinate individual interests to those of the community, if collectively they agree upon the expediency of doing so. Now the integrity of the Danish Monarchy was deemed a European necessity, and a definite settlement of the open question of succession was looked upon as the best means for insuring the former; it was considered the safest guarantee for the maintenance of the general peace and of the established equilibrium, which a possible gravitation of the Duchies towards Germany, so it was thought, might affect.

Having once taken this view, and having embodied the same in the Protocol of 1852, the Powers were certainly bound to honour their own signature, and Denmark cannot be blamed for having expected something better than platonic sympathy or doleful pity.

At any rate when we look at the prominent part taken by Lord John Russell, when we remember the clatter of swords in his despatches, and when we consider the moral encouragement lavished, nay forced upon Denmark, we can come to no other conclusion but that our dignity made it an imperative duty, a *quasi* question of honour, not to abandon her after having been the chief supporter of the Protocol of 1852. It is much to be lamented that, although Lord Malmesbury had a majority of nine in the Lords, Mr. Disraeli's resolution in favour of Denmark, so strongly condemning

the attitude of the Government as having "lowered the just influence of this country in the councils of Europe,"* should have been lost by a majority of eighteen ; and one dare hardly think how different would be the aspect of the political situation had these few voices turned the other way.

There can be no question on whom falls the full responsibility of the inconsistent, ungenerous and un-English policy of those days, to which all the disasters and changes of the last fifteen years can easily be traced ; and one might feel tempted to apply to Lord John's handling of foreign affairs, the words of Sir Philip Francis: "Passion of any kind, if it existed, might excite action. With still many generous exceptions, the body of the country is lost in apathy and indifference ; sometimes strutting on stilts, for the most part grovelling on its belly, no life-blood in the heart, and, instead of reason and reflection, a *caput mortuum* for a headpiece."†

But not England alone, the other Powers were guilty, for they undertook collectively something more than a moral responsibility when they appended their signatures to this international instrument, and they had surely no right to place Denmark wantonly in a false position, and to let her fight by herself the battle of the Protocol. For who fathered the wrongs in litigation, who encouraged king and country to oppose the German pretensions, who urged Denmark to insist upon the bran-new stipu-

* On May 1864. See Sketch I., p. 57.

† Letter of Sir Philip Francis to Lord Holland, 1816.

lations of the Protocol, but the signatories of the title-deeds of 1852 ? and yet the very statesmen who fancied they had theoretically insured the future peace of the world by a diplomatic *chef d'œuvre*, and who for years had been fighting on paper for Denmark's rights and aspirations, were those who lost their nerve the moment swords were rattling in earnest.

Lord John, whose provoking language and whose threatening despatches had so much contributed to envenom the question ; he who had accused Austria and Prussia "of bad faith and of a loose and capricious interpretation of international treaties ;"* he who had christened the Protocol "*loi publique de l'Europe* ;"† was the first to back out of the responsibilities incumbent on the leader of the pro-Danish agitation in Europe.

But I leave to a more authorised pen than mine the painful duty of putting Earl Russell in the pillory of public reprobation, for I find in the *Quarterly Review* of January 1864, the following passage, which I may be permitted to quote, as it explains—though hardly in flattering terms—the weathercock policy of Lord Russell, and his absurd "bear and bull" proceedings *in re* Denmark. The *Quarterly* says :

"And what will England do ? It is a question that concerns us deeply ; but it is humiliating to be obliged to confess that it is one with which the Germans do not trouble themselves much. Of the true policy of England there can be little doubt, for it has

* Despatch to Mr. Murray, Dec. 17th, 1863.

† At the ninth meeting of the Conference on June 9th, 1864.

been upheld by statesmen of all sides in every age. As the greatest commercial power she can never suffer the highway of nations to fall into hands that may close it.

“The Sound, the Bosphorus, and the Straits of Gibraltar, the Isthmus of Suez, and the Isthmus of Darien must never be subject to the will of a first-rate power. Therefore it is against the policy of England that Denmark should become the dependency of Germany.

“But Denmark has a stronger claim upon our support than any motives of mere self-interest can furnish, for it was at the instance of England, more than of any other Power, that the Treaty of London was signed. It is not a treaty of guarantee, and therefore in strict law we are not bound. But a treaty so recent, so distinctly pointed at the contingency which has just occurred, cannot be lightly abandoned. If we refused to stand by this engagement, which we took so large a share in negotiating, we may for the future spare ourselves the needless pastime of signing treaties altogether. Already our power to uphold the public law, which we take so prominent a share in making, is subject to doubts that are not flattering to our national pride. Lord Russell’s fierce notes and pacific measures furnish an endless theme for the taunts of those who would gladly see the influence of England in the councils of Europe destroyed. The vigorous protests that have issued from the Foreign Office in the matter of Savoy and of Poland, and of the American blockade,

combined with the meek submission that invariably follows them, have caused the conviction to prevail extensively in Europe, that, however she may write, England will never fight with any state that is able to defend itself.

“ In the eastern or the southern seas, where there is no enemy that can resist her, she can still show her ancient prowess. She can exhibit great decision in Brazil, and burn down defenceless towns with wonderful vigour in Japan. But there is no danger that she will ever allow her martial ardour to betray her into a step more dangerous than a ferocious despatch, when she is confronted with an adversary of anything like equal strength. . . .

“ It cannot be denied that the conduct of Lord Russell has given but too much point to these sarcasms. Even in this Danish matter the fickle and trimming character of his policy has won for us little respect, and has destroyed the influence we might have previously possessed.

“ When Denmark seemed in earnest and Germany comparatively lukewarm, Lord Russell was a strong Dane. . . . Shortly afterwards the aspect of the political horizon darkened. Germany became thoroughly in earnest, and there was no doubt that if she were in earnest, Germany was the strongest power. Lord Russell's views underwent a salutary change. He became a decided German. . . . Such vagaries have naturally produced that contempt of our power and of our courage which the Germans have universally expressed, and upon which they are evidently acting.’

As nothing could be added to the *philippicæ* of the *Quarterly*, let us return to the subject of this notice.

General von Bülow, who during his stay with us, since 1865, has done his best to add to the popularity of the Danish cause, and to the undivided sympathy felt in England with the sad fate that has befallen the valiant cradle of our Princess, enjoys a position somewhat similar to that of the late Mr. van de Weyer; and both General and Baroness von Bülow have been adopted, like the family of the lamented Belgian statesman, as favourites of society, as if we were anxious to make up in social attentions for the deficiency of our political conduct towards Denmark.

Born, so to speak, a soldier, and at the age of twenty a captain on the Danish staff, Herr von Bülow witnessed, only at a distance, the agitations of which Uwe Lornsen was the soul, and which the constitution granted by King Frederick VI. in 1831*

* Re-introducing separate provincial states (the Diets had been suppressed since 1712), Article I. of the Constitution of May 28th, 1831, said: "Provided this does not alter the corporate connection (*Social-Nexus*) of our *Schleswig-Holstein* nobility (*Ritterschaft*), for which the resolutions of June 27, 1732, stand good." From this passage the inference has been drawn, that not having been distinctly mentioned, the political privileges constituting the union of the Duchies, and temporarily in abeyance, had altogether been abolished. The existence or non-existence of the political *nexus* between *Schleswig-Holstein* is the vicious circle in which Danish and German patriots have been tilting with each other. For the impartial observer it will, however, be difficult to understand how it is possible to set aside the charter of 1460, which forms the basis of the connection between the Danish crown and the Duchies (*Holstein* was only a county at the time), when so long a line of kings and dukes have confirmed it in such clear words,

seemed in no way able to appease. However, those were the comparatively happy days when there was

as for instance in the treaties (*Unions Verträge*) of 1533 and 1623, and the treaty of Odense of March 25th, 1579.

That King Frederick IV. contemplated the amalgamation of Schleswig with Denmark, and that he effected a *nominal* incorporation in 1721, is beyond controversy, for, as Hüyer and Bunæus, the King's biographers, very truly say, the Great Seal of Denmark had even been altered to symbolise the change in relations between Denmark proper and the re-united royal and ducal parts of Schleswig. But then two wrongs do not constitute a right, and we have the opinion of our own Government on the meaning of the English and French Acts of Guarantee of July 26th and August 18th, 1720, so often invoked as the international title to Schleswig, even by our present Premier in his famous speech of April 19th, 1848. In a rescript of 2nd and 13th of December, 1720, King George I. expresses himself thus: "It is an acknowledged legal principle, that in all contracts and acquisitions whatever is acquired passes over to the acquirer with the *commodis* and *oneribus* attaching thereto, and that the acquirer neither did nor could *de jure* obtain a greater right in the thing acquired than the former possessor had enjoyed therein; nor does our before-mentioned guarantees extend further." And after the publication of the Danish letters patent of August 22nd, 1721, George I. says in another rescript of Jan. 27th and Feb. 7th, 1721: "That we did not understand the assurance contained in the guarantees accorded by our Crown to that of Denmark in respect of Schleswig territory, otherwise than as far as regards the lien (the rights) which the reigning Dukes of Holstein-Gottorp possessed upon Schleswig, *salvo omnino jure cujuscunque tertii*." Both rescripts indicating clearly that England and France did not by their guarantees intend to sever the existing relations between Schleswig and Holstein, but only "*à lui garantir et conserver dans une possession continue et paisible la partie du Duché de Schleswig laquelle S. M. danoise a entre les mains*" (Acts of Guarantee of July 26th and August 18th, 1720).

But a farther and conclusive evidence is to be found in the repeated declarations of the Danish Government, such as the declarations of King Christian VI. of May 12th, 1731, and of June 27th, 1732, then in Article XVI. of the Treaty of April 11th, 1767, and Article VII. of the Treaty of May 21st, 1773, bearing the signature of King Christian VII., and more recently in the declaration of King Christian VIII. of May 13th, 1840, all of which recognise an autonomy and a connection of the Duchies, incompatible with the theory of their political demise on August 22nd, 1721.

not yet a "Schleswig-Holstein" question on the European horizon; the dissensions were purely internal, the question of the succession was still dormant, and the representatives of the Holstein nobility were even *les enfants gâtés* of Court and town; for the democratic spirit of the Danish people having rooted out the last privileges of the once all-powerful Danish aristocracy, the scions of the old German families had pushed their way to the front, and, more refined, or perhaps more pliable, they had taken possession of nearly all places at Court and in the diplomatic service.

Yet there were a few exceptions, and Herr von Bülow, a thoroughbred Dane, had the good luck to be nominated aide-de-camp to the Governor of Copenhagen, H. S. H. the Landgrave, William of Hesse, brother of H. R. H. the Duchess of Cambridge, and also of being appointed equerry to H. R. H. the Landgræfin, the heir-presumptive to the Danish crown, in case the line male should become extinct.

The negotiations about the eventual succession of the House of Augustenburg to the Danish throne fall into this period, the supporters of this combination pleading that it would prevent all possible complications which might be anticipated at the extinction of the royal line; but, fortunately for the present reigning house, and for the father of our Princess, the Duke Christian of Augustenburg had been estranged from the Danish Court by his marriage with a Countess Daneskjold, whom King

Frederick VI. declined to receive as a princess of his house, a circumstance which contributed materially to push the Duke into the arms of those who were advocating a secession of the Duchies from Denmark, should His Majesty die without issue.

The consequence was that the Duke's eventual chances to the throne became more doubtful, that he grew unpopular in Danish circles, and that finally, with the concurrence of the Parliament of Roeskilde, and at the instigation of the Oerstaedt Cabinet, His Majesty proclaimed in 1846 the indivisibility of the monarchy, fixing at the same time the succession according to the *lex regia*, which, although binding for Denmark since the time of Frederick III. in 1665, was contrary to the *magna charta* of the Duchies, where the Salic law was in force since time immemorial.

The open letter of King Christian VIII., of July 8th, 1846,* was the first step in that direction; the next was the proclamation of the Constitution of 1848, which incorporated the Duchies, and had the natural consequences of dividing the realm into hostile camps, German and Danish, and of rousing an opposition prejudicial to the interests of all concerned.

* The open letter of King Christian VIII., carried partly out the motion put by Algreen Ussing in 1844 in the Parliament of Roeskilde, which said: "May it please your Majesty solemnly to declare that the Danish Monarchy, i.e., Denmark proper, the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein with the Duchy of Lauenburg, is one inseparable (*unzer-trennliches*) empire, which is to go as an indivisible hereditament, according to the provisions of the *lex regia*." Yet, in dealing with Schleswig, the King declared distinctly, "That nothing was to be altered in its relations to Holstein."

The events of those days are so recent that we all remember how His Majesty, yielding to the Danish Radicals, consented to an occupation of the Duchies by the royal troops, after having first sent home the deputies of Schleswig and Holstein.

This measure was followed in rapid succession by the formation of a Provisional Government,* by a wild uproar in all Germany, and by violent demonstrations in favour of the Duchies, which culminated in the occupation of Holstein by the Prussians,† so graphically criticised by Mr. Disraeli in the House of Commons, when he said :

“In this state of affairs a remarkable event occurred. There had been a *quasi* revolution at

* “A Provisional Government was formed in Schleswig, and they published an announcement that they (the Schleswigers) would not be incorporated with the kingdom of Denmark, but that they chose to become a German State, in common with the Duchy of Holstein.” (Speech of Mr. Disraeli in the House of Commons, April 19th, 1848.) But it ought to be kept in mind that the first proclamation of this Provisional Government, established at Kiel, declared emphatically that they only intended “to conduct the government in the name of their Duke (the King of Denmark) with a view to the preservation of the rights of the land, and of the hereditary Duke,” adding “that he had been forced by the people of Copenhagen to take an inimical position against the Duchies, and that his will was no longer free.” Thus starting, as a Danish author calls it, very truly, “The fiction of the un-free King.”—(Denmark and Germany since 1815, by Charles A. Gosch, p. 114.)

† In a note of April 20th, 1848, to Lord Westmoreland, Baron Arnim, the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, attempted to shield Prussia's interference behind the assurances that it had thus not only protected the rights of Germany, but also prevented “the legitimate rights of the King-Duke from being compromised by a rebellion, into which the lawful resistance and defence of a right might easily have degenerated.”

Berlin. There, too, was a monarch, who had granted liberal institutions, but under different circumstances to the King of Denmark. . . . Not content with merely creating the happiness of the people of Prussia, the King of that country, hearing of what had occurred in Schleswig, received a deputation from the Provisional Government set up there, promised that the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein should, if under his patronage and protection, be acknowledged as German States,* and then ordered some of his troops, who had not perhaps been so successful in Berlin as he had intended, to recover their laurels in an invasion of the states of a friendly power.

“ Sir, there is probably no event in modern history more unjustifiable than the conduct of Prussia in these circumstances. Up to this moment not a single rational cause has been alleged for the erratic conduct of the Court of Berlin, no case of justification has been put forward ; and the only means by which a vindication has been sought to be established has been in a weak adaption of some of the dreamy effusions of German professors.

“ But Germany, which possesses almost every other advantage, is not a great naval power, and Germany wants a coast. That is the real reason why Denmark, supposed to be weak, is to be invaded in this age of liberty on the plea of nationality. It

* It may be mentioned that His Majesty went even further, by recognising in a much-commented autograph letter the rights of the House of Augustenburg.

is to gain the harbours of the Baltic and to seize the mouths of the Elbe that the plea of German nationality is put forth. . . . I do not wish to argue this case with respect to the interests of England. I do not wish to say anything about whether it is or is not for the interest of England that a new naval power should spring up among the nations of the Baltic and northern seas. But this I wish to lay down as a principle, that it is for the interest of England, and not of England alone, but of all Europe, that peace should be maintained."

Then after a sharp criticism of Chevalier Bunsen's "Memorandums on the Constitutional Rights of the Duchies,"* and a valiant lance broken for the Treaty of Gottorp of 1715, by which England guaranteed Schleswig to Denmark, in consideration of the cession of Bremen to Hanover, (guarantees confirmed in conjunction with France in 1720,†) Mr. Disraeli reminded the House that England had guaranteed, by the Treaty of Vienna, a part of Saxony to Prussia, and that during thirty-three years, on at least two occasions, revolts and insurrections would have broken out in Saxon-Prussia, as he called it, had it not been for that English guarantee. And he concluded his eloquent speech with the words :

"May God defend the right, and may the peace

* Presented to Viscount Palmerston on the 8th of April, 1848, with a postscript of April 15th.

† See page 11, the Rescripts of George I., which give to the guarantee of 1720 a different aspect ; the isolated text would refer to the English sense of justice, right, and international duties.

of Europe be maintained by the justice and by the power of England."

Lord Palmerston, in acknowledging "that circumstances connected with the previous history of Denmark might make every theory affecting the welfare of that state a matter of peculiar interest to all men of high feeling and of liberal sentiment, and that Mr. Disraeli had no doubt exercised a very proper discretion in calling the attention of the House and of the country to the engagements which England had entered into with regard to Schleswig," expressed "his perfect readiness to concur with him, and with what appeared to be the general sense and opinion of the House with respect to the duty of England, and to what was essential to her honour, and therefore for her well-understood interests, that all her engagements should be made good." And he declared "that it was not fitting that a country like England should repudiate her existing engagements, and that we ought to stand by them, and take care that they were fulfilled."

But if such were the sentiments of our statesmen, and behind them of the country, England's indignation at the treatment of Denmark was not isolated; the other Powers, though perhaps on different grounds, seemed equally excited, and the less inclined to witness the Dano-Prussian conflict with indifference, as the revolutionary tendencies of 1848 had tinted the Schleswig-Holstein* question with an un-

* A novel term, and the original charter of King Christian I., which forms the basis of the political privileges of Schleswig and of Holstein,

pleasant shade of red, which explains why the disturbances in the Duchies, for which King Frederick William's bosom friend, Chevalier Bunsen, had been so warmly pleading,* were simply labelled "insurrection" the moment the impulsiveness of His Majesty began to evaporate.

The inhabitants of Schleswig and of Holstein—the lawful subjects of the Duke of Augustenburg, as the King of Prussia had styled them—were denounced as rebels; and the Pretender—His Majesty's *protégé* of yesterday—was branded as a usurper, regardless of the fact that it was the ill-advised enthusiasm of King Frederick William that first had misled the Duchies, the Duke of Augustenburg, nay, the German people; for the whole question would never have taken such alarming proportions

knows of no body politic called "Schleswig-Holstein," for it says: 'The rev. prelates, valiant knights, and honourable cities and inhabitants of the Duchy of Schleswig, of the lands and country of Holstein and Stormarn, have elected us a Duke of Schleswig, Count of Holstein and Stormarn, before mentioned; and they have taken us to be their lord, and rendered us homage, not as King of Denmark, but as their lord of the lands before mentioned,' etc. Moreover, the document by which Christian's sons confirmed their father's pledges, is inscribed: "*Approbatio Illustrissimi Domini Johannis, regis hodierni proprio nomine, et nomine tutorio sui fratris Friderici etiam hodierni, privilegiorum provinciarum Holsatiae et Slesvicensis,*" showing clearly that, although linked together by the person of one or more common masters, and likewise by parliamentary, ecclesiastical, administrative, judicial, and financial connection, they were distinct parts of one political unit, one Danish, the other German; and even Lord Molesworth, who, in his "Account of Denmark as it was in 1692," is in no way friendly to the Danes, says, nearly two hundred years ago: "I include in this account the Duchy of Schleswig as part of Denmark, but not the Duchy of Holstein; because the former was a fief of that crown, the latter of the empire."

* In his *pro-memoria* to Lord Palmerston.

but for the King of Prussia's personal support, who, unasked for, and chiefly in order to occupy and to divert his guards after their humiliating exit from Berlin, had proclaimed himself the godfather of the Schleswig-Holstein cause, and the leader of the subsequent German movement. However, when the European Cabinets became frightened of the red spectre disguised in Schleswig-Holstein colours, and when England, France, Russia, and Sweden collectively resolved to maintain the integrity of Denmark as far as Schleswig was concerned,* His Prussian Majesty felt somewhat ashamed of having too hastily espoused what now appeared a revolutionary nightmare; and rightly so, for Schleswig-Holstein had been made the watchword of popular discontent, the motto of the opposition in the various German States; and all those whose too liberal aspirations were bridled at home, enthusiastically joined in noisy demonstrations for the Duchies as a means for letting off their compressed stock of radicalism; and this

* Le Gouvernement de la République Française, celui de S. M. la Reine de la Grande Bretagne, celui de S. M. l'Empereur de Russie, Roi de Pologne, et celui de S. M. le Roi de Suède et de Norvège, ayant résolu de maintenir conjointement le droit du royaume de Danemark en ce qui est de l'union indissoluble du Duché de Schleswig au Danemark proprement dit, renouvellent collectivement par la présente déclaration leurs garanties relatives à ce droit et stipulées aux traités et conventions faisant partie du droit public de l'Europe, à savoir, l'acte de garantie de la France du 14 Juin, 1720; celui de l'Angleterre du 26 Juillet même année; le traité provisoire entre la Russie et la Danemark du 22 Avril, 1767; le traité définitif entre les mêmes du 21 Mai, 1773; l'acte de garantie et de renonciation par l'Impératrice de Russie du 31 Mai même année, et le traité entre la Suède et la Danemark du 3 Juin, 1720.

accounts for the sudden *volte face* of the King of Prussia, His Majesty's disavowal of the Duke, the disarmament of the Holstein army, and the subsequent surrender of the Duchies to Denmark.

It was intended as a homœopathic cure for the spreading revolutionary evil, and it was done in such a hurry that they even forgot to stipulate for a line of demarcation, as suggested by Lord Palmerston in his despatch of April 23rd, 1848, to Chevalier Bunsen, when his lordship advised the incorporation of only North Schleswig into Denmark, leaving Holstein and Lauenburg, with the addition of the German-speaking parts of Schleswig, under the supreme jurisdiction of the *Bundestag*; instead of that, the framers of the treaty of peace of July, 1850, had inserted therein a mystical clause, which reserved "the rights of all concerned."*

And, to complicate matters still more, Prussia made all sorts of difficulties† for joining the Confer-

* "*Les hautes parties contractantes se réservent les droits qui leur ont appartenu réciproquement avant la guerre.*"—(Article III. of the Treaty of July 2nd, 1850.)

† Lord Bloomfield, writing to Lord Palmerston on June 26th, 1850, from St. Petersburg, when the Prince of Prussia (the present King) was at the time on a visit, and alluding to these difficulties, and the negotiations between the Prince and Count Nesselrode, said: "These interviews resulted, however, in H. R. H. consenting to take for the consideration of the Cabinet of Berlin, the two following points connected with the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein, and which I am further told were given to him by Count Nesselrode in the form of a memorandum, accompanied with the declaration that Russia conceived she has a right to insist on them. The first is, that Prussia will not oppose the arrangements which may be made by the King of Denmark respecting the succession. The second is that Prussia shall guarantee the neutrality of Germany in the event of a war between Denmark and the Duchies."

ences of July 4th, convened by Lord Palmerston, with a view of finding, by the adoption of a preliminary protocol, a *modus vivendi* for unfortunate Denmark. "Let me indulge in the hope that you will not press any longer a protocol,* nor seem to impose, at the head of a European coalition, upon Germany an arrangement which must by her always be considered as *res acta inter alios*, as one which disposes of her rights as if she was to be 'Polonised,' to use an expression coined by you." So wrote Chevalier Bunsen on July 3rd, 1850, to Viscount Palmerston, and twenty-four hours later he expressed himself even stronger, by saying: "*Les mêmes considérations qui aujourd'hui ne me permettent pas de me rendre au Foreign Office, devraient m'imposer, dans de certaines éventualités, le pénible devoir de réserver officiellement, et de protester solennellement contre le principe d'une ingérence des autres Puissances européennes dans les affaires intérieures du Corps germanique, principe attentatoire à l'indépendance et à la dignité de l'Allemagne, subversif du droit public de l'Europe, hostile à toutes les libertés nationales existantes, et contenant le germe d'incalculables complications et guerres futures.*"

On July 5th, in a third communication, to which was joined a *Précis historique*,† Chevalier Bunsen

* "Un tel protocole est dangereux en ce qu'il consacre en soi-même le principe d'intervention étrangère dans les affaires intérieures d'une puissance indépendante."—(Chevalier Bunsen.)

† The following extract from Chevalier Bunsen's *Précis historique* will help us to understand the views taken by him, and after him by Germany at large: "*Il est de notoriété publique que déjà avant 1848, la*

renewed his objections by assuring Lord Palmerston, "*que l'accession à un tel protocol de la part de l'Allemagne est exclusivement du ressort de la Confédération germanique.*" Adding, "*ni la Prusse ni l'Autriche ne peuvent, même par un acte d'accession conditionnelle détériorer le statu quo du droit dans lequel se trouve la Confédération dont elles sont les membres.*"

And when finally Prussia joined in the preliminary protocol agreed to by England, France, Russia, Austria, Sweden and Denmark, she indulged in a kind of mental reservation, by adding *post festum* "that she intended to remain on the side of right (*auf dem Rechtsboden*), in accordance with the Federal decrees of April 4th and 12th, 1846." A proceeding against which Lord Westmoreland formally protested, as it was certainly novel to make such a contradictory declaration, after previously having signed the treaty ; but Herr von Usedom's

France sur l'instigation du Danemark fit des démarches répétées auprès du Gouvernement britannique, afin que celui-ci renouvelât les garanties que la France et l'Angleterre sont censées d'avoir données en 1721 au Duc régnant de Schleswig, pour l'éventualité de réclamations de l'autre ligne de cette maison qui avait été dépossédée. Le Ministère britannique, bien qu'il n'entrât pas dans une discussion sur la valeur fort problématique de ses garanties par rapport au droit positif, déclara pourtant à plusieurs reprises devant le Parlement, que les garanties on étaient éteintes (comme elles le sont sans doute en conséquence de l'arrangement fait en 1773 sous les auspices de la Russie), on n'étaient pas applicables au cas actuel, la souveraineté, du Duc régnant de Schleswig, Roi de Danemark n'étant ni attaqué, ni contestée par personne . . . et c'est également notoire que le Gouvernement britannique se refuse en 1848 et 1849 à tout projet d'ingérence européenne dans les questions relatives au Duché de Holstein et de Schleswig, et aux garanties à donner à des arrangements qui s'y rapporteraient."

instructions were peremptory, and leaving the room, he laid the Prussian minute on the Conference table, probably imagining thus to save appearances. Following up this shilly-shallying policy, Baron Schleinitz, the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, indulged in a *mémoire justificatoire*,* full of pompous assurances of Prussia's eternal devotion to her German duties and to true right, which was intended to whitewash the King's unfair way of dealing with both Denmark and the Duchies.

The peace of 1850 was meant as a blow at revolutionary Germany; it was the triumph of misunderstood and misguided Conservatism, and perfectly answered Prince Schwarzenberg's intentions, who, jealous of Prussia's action in the Danish matter, and of King Frederick William's consequent popularity, had anxiously been waiting for an opportunity of taking the trumps out of His Majesty's hands, determined to appropriate for Austria the German idea hatched in Holstein. Only Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, the regenerator of Austria, and the would-be mentor of Germany, did not know how to take advantage of the grand opportunity offered him, and he contented himself with the poor satisfaction of coining pseudo-German ideas and a second-hand popularity out of Prussian humiliations.

The stipulations of Olmütz † and the appointment

* Despatch of Baron Schleinitz to Count Bernstorff, Aug. 25, 1850.

† One of the leading German statesmen remarked at the time, "that if Austria had been obliged to come to Breslau instead of Prussia going to Olmütz, she would not have been let off so cheaply, *i.e.* with a newly bound copy of the *Bundesakte* under her arm.

of joint commissaries in Holstein, backed up by an army "of execution,"* were Austria's work ; it was little else but the continuation of the war under a milder form, a gentlemanly sort of affair without bloodshed, and with plenty of writing and courteous assurances of mutual esteem and consideration. In fact "the execution" and the diplomatic negotiations were only meant for advertising Prince Schwarzenberg's "constitutional" German inspirations, for, heedless of the future, he cared little where he was going, provided he could keep Prussia in the background, and monopolise the attention of Europe as the conservative champion of German rights and aspirations. But whilst Austria was thus discounting her apparent diplomatic victories, the Great Powers were elated by the unravelling of the Danish knot, which they saw in the preliminary Protocol of August 23rd, 1850—"the sire of the famous Protocol of 1852"—which openly pronounced for King Frederick VII., who, willing to meet all difficulties, had pledged himself by his manifesto of July 14th *not* to incorporate Schleswig, and to maintain the twin independence of the Duchies.

According to this preliminary arrangement, a new order of succession was to insure the integrity of the Danish Monarchy ; and all disputed or questionable rights and claims of third parties, with the exception of those of the German Confederation (as a body), were to be sacrificed to the general welfare. The whole thing was an artificial combination of

* In conformity with Article III. of the *Olmützer Punctationen*.

impossibilities and contradictions; it was not a solution, but an expedient, and well calculated to give serious apprehensions for the future, as no one knew where Danish rights were to end, and where German ones were to begin; for the line of demarcation between the King-Duke's Danish and German attributes and duties remained as before, a puzzle to himself and to every one else, and we have only to peruse the voluminous correspondence which preceded the signing of the Protocol of 1852, if we want proofs that all Cabinets were, without a single exception, in a fog on this very point.*

Lord John† advised the Danish Government "to insure the happiness of the populations by mutual concessions," without, however, naming them; Count Nesselrode recommended Denmark "to come to an understanding with Germany,"‡ but without saying how; Prince Schwarzenberg suggested "a conscientious and impartial reorganisation of the monarchy, the unjustifiable pretensions of Denmark

* In after years Lord John Russell confessed that "treaties, protocols and despatches afford little light upon this subject, and the glimmering rays which they do afford tend rather to lead us astray than to guide us right."—(Despatch to Mr. Paget of Sept. 24th, 1862.)

† Despatch of Lord John Russell of Sept. 23rd, 1850.

‡ In giving this advice, Count Nesselrode added that the justice of the reclamations of the Duchies could not be denied; whilst soon after, in a despatch of April 19th (May 1st), 1851, to Baron Ungern Sternberg, the Russian Envoy at Copenhagen, he spoke "of the moderation of the Danish Government, and of his satisfaction at having successfully pleaded in Germany the Danish cause, *avec le zèle qu'inspirait la conviction de son bon droit*;" a perfect medley of contradictions.

having been the cause of a *lawful** insurrection ;” and, not to remain behind his colleagues, Baron Manteuffel hinted “that no one’s rights must be injured ;” a medley of nebulous suggestions, crowned by Count Sponneck’s quixotical declaration † “that the Danish Government had adopted the exclusion of all national tendencies as the basis of its future policy ;” as if it were possible for people to renounce their nationality, as if one could strip a country of its past, and amalgamate different races by a stroke of the pen, or a fresh arrangement of old frontiers.

However, all statesmen seemed to agree in one thing, that Germany and the Duchies had certain inviolable rights, inconsistent with the new dogma of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, and antagonistic to a good understanding between the two rival nationalities ; yet the European Cabinets proclaimed “the integrity” of Denmark-Holstein, without fixing the landmark for the dualistic tendencies of the populations, which, moreover, ought to have been consulted beforehand. Thus the very stipulations which diplomacy had penned for the peaceful settlement of the Danish question, opened the doors wider than before to all imaginable interpretations, to illegalities of every kind, to reclamations without end, and finally to the collapse of the whole fabric.

The Great Powers said : “ We want the integrity

* A rather startling expression from the ultra-conservative lips of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg.

† Count Sponneck’s *mémoire* of Feb. 8th, 1851.

of the Danish-Holstein Monarchy, and we proclaim it as an article of international creed, although we know that hereby the rights of third parties will be affected ; however, as we do not wish to injure any one, we impose upon Denmark the duty of conciliating the claims of Germany, of the Duchies, and of the Augustenburgs, which *we* have been disregarding,* but we decline giving any opinion how this can be done." The solution of this ambiguous problem would have required a political *Robert Houdin*, so that we can hardly be surprised if Danish statesmen were not equal to the performance, and that they failed in their difficult task, *à ménager la chèvre et les choux*, as contemplated by the promoters of the Protocol.

The Talleyrands of the day fancied they could insure the peace of the world by drawing "a paper curtain" between Danish aspirations and German pretensions, or *vice versa*, and the Protocol was signed on May 8th, 1852 ; a political anomaly if we think of the consequences, and the trials it carried in its wake. Lord John Russell styled it in later days "*une loi publique de l'Europe*," but he would surely have done better to baptize it "a co-operative international blunder," for what else is a law we cannot or will not enforce, nay, a law purposely framed so as to give all parties a chance for evading it ?

* It may be mentioned that, of all Powers, Russia was most adverse to the Augustenburgs, and Sir Andrew Buchanan reports in a despatch of August 23rd, 1851, to Lord Palmerston, that Baron Brunnow had told him "they had no rights," and suggesting £10,000 a year as an ample *fiche de consolation*.

Herr von Bülow, who had taken an active part in the military operations against Germany, as Chief of the Staff of the Danish Division at Alsen, and who had been very severely wounded at Idstedt, began about this time his diplomatic career.

Appointed Military Envoy at Frankfort, he found there ample opportunities for studying the incompatibility of Danish and German views, so diametrically opposed in the interpretation of the Schleswig-Holstein enigma, and he could easily convince himself that the minor States were determined not to yield to the dictatorial provisions of the Protocol of London, which the Powers intended to force upon the German Confederation, after having ignored its existence during the whole of the negotiations.* It was a slight deeply resented by the German people,† not unnaturally indignant that Foreign Powers should urge the pretension of settling internal German matters without consulting the Diet. Divided amongst themselves, and seldom agreeing on any-

* Signed by the Five Great Powers and by Sweden on May 8th, 1852; most European Cabinets adhered to it in the course of the year, thus: Wurtemberg on Nov. 23rd, Tuscany on Nov. 30th, Sardinia on Dec. 4th, Spain on Dec. 5th, Saxony on Dec. 9th, Hesse on Dec. 16th, Hanover on Dec. 18th, Netherlands on Dec. 20th, Belgium on Dec. 28th, Greece on Jan. 10th—22nd, 1853; Portugal on March 22nd, 1853, and Bavaria, after having long hesitated, on April, 1853, Herr von der Pfordten considering the declaration of the Duke of Augustenburg as a renunciation of the Duchy of Holstein, and yielding to the diplomatic pressure of Austria.

† And equally by German statesmen (see pp. 21, 22, Chevalier Bunsen's letters to Lord Palmerston); the more is it therefore to be wondered why Prussia, and in her wake the leading minor States, should individually have given their assent, when collectively at Frankfort they protested against seeing the rights of the Confederation disregarded.

thing, all Germans found themselves for once in the same lobby, and, thanks to the absurdly irritating ways of the Great Powers, the Schleswig-Holstein question became the rallying-point of north and south, and high and low; it became, so to say, a German household care, and by-and-by the corner-stone of the powerful edifice which the genius of Prince Bismarck has erected on the ruins of the identical rights which a sense of justice had prompted the minor States to defend against foreign intervention. The German Confederation came to grief over it; however, the pieces were good, and success and glory proved a wonderful cement in the hands of a master builder like the Prince Chancellor.

But we must not anticipate events, for we are still in 1852, when the renunciation of Duke Christian* seemed likely to pave the way for an understanding. Yet there were other rights besides his to be considered; and if he, no doubt, had been perfectly at liberty to renounce his birthright for a mess of pottage, value £400,000 as stipulated by the *Frank-*

* This was Herr von Bismarck's first diplomatic victory, for it was he who, as Prussian Envoy at the Diet, conducted the successful negotiations with the Duke of Augustenburg, and induced H. S. H. to accept a monetary compensation in exchange for his estates in the Duchies, and on condition of his recognising the provisions of the Protocol of 1852, as expressed in Article III. of the *Frankfurter Recess* signed on Dec. 30th, 1852, which reads as follows:—"We vow and promise besides, for ourselves and our family, on our princely word and honour, to undertake nothing calculated to disturb or endanger the peace in His Majesty's dominion. Likewise we engage ourselves in no way to oppose any present or future resolutions of His Majesty regulating the succession to all countries now united under his sceptre, or the eventual organisation of His Majesty's monarchy."

furter Recess of April 22nd, 1852, this private arrangement of his, if it affected the succession of his descendants, could in no way touch the rights of the Duchies, still less could it abolish the federal obligations of His Majesty the King of Denmark, as a member of the Diet for Holstein and Lauenburg; and even Danish statesmen, such as Count Sponneck; Minister Hall, and *Geheimer Conferenz Rath* Bluhme, have never attempted to contest the latter part of the question.

Had Denmark been wise, she would have availed herself of the favourable dispositions and good offices of the Great Powers, for making her peace with the irritated and irritable Diet; but, like a spoiled child, she would have it all her own way, altogether forgetting that Austria and Prussia had only yielded, at the Conferences of London, to the pressure of the other Powers, under the distinct proviso that Denmark would keep her promises, and that the concessions made to her would consolidate a good understanding. Instead of that, they became the source of new complications and difficulties; however, the Danish Government must not alone be blamed, for circumstances, over which they had no control, much contributed to envenom matters. To begin with, it was a serious mistake not to take into account the exigencies of national feeling, and to make no allowance for the pressure which a Danish majority would necessarily exercise upon a Constitutional Government, whatever the wishes and intentions of the Crown might be with regard to the German provinces.

Austria and Prussia had themselves experienced the high tide of popular enthusiasm in Germany, and they ought therefore to have credited the Danish Government with analogous difficulties at home, instead of which they would only see ill-will and intentional provocations in the acts and declarations which the Danophile current wormed out of the Cabinet of Copenhagen. This, however, does not imply that the latter was free from blame,* for *le ton fait la musique*; and there are two ways of saying and of doing things, Denmark evidently choosing the wrong one, if we take the trouble to examine the proceedings.

The law of succession, promulgated on July 13th, 1853, was followed on October 2nd, 1855, by a new Constitution, opposed in spirit and form to the solemn undertaking arrived at in 1851-52, and as it aimed at an undisguised Danification of the Duchies, it was natural that the *Bundestag* should have demanded its repeal, as far so Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned,† leaving, however, Schleswig to take care of herself, should she think fit to protest. Backed up by Saxony and Hanover, Austria and Prussia were busily beating the big drum of injured German feelings, and no doubt it must have been mortifying for Germany to be trifled with by Denmark, as the object of the Constitution of 1855 was ob-

* At a later period, in a letter to Lord John Russell of August 28th, 1864, Lord Palmerston said: "The Danish Government, both under the late and under the present King, undoubtedly committed many mistakes, both of commission and omission."

† Vote of the Diet of Oct. 29th, 1857.

viously the drowning of the voices of the German representatives in an overwhelming Danish majority, thus creating a pseudo-constitutional legality for absorbing the Duchies little by little. But if Denmark's want of good faith was undeniable in this instance, the blame, as I said before, is not hers alone, for she never would have dared to go so far, had she not been placed in a false and abnormal position by the patronising intervention of the Great Powers, who, by the ambiguous and incomplete Protocol of 1852, and the proclamation of the Danish United Monarchy (*Dänische Gesamt Monarchie*), under the guarantee of Europe, had raised hopes and ambitious wishes in the hearts of the Danish population, incompatible with Denmark's treaty-obligations towards the Diet. Surely the statesmen who had fathered such anomalies ought to have taken their share of the responsibilities, and have foreseen the inevitable conflict which they had been preparing, when they invented a Danish Monarchy partly under German control.

It is a sad page of modern history, and does little credit to the perspicacity of our international treaty-mongers, who lacked even the courage boldly to pronounce for one side, and managed to wrong both by a shuffling, undecided, and undignified policy; but as we have not in politics the *code Napoléon*, forbidding *la recherche de la paternité*, history will not fail to register the stillborn Protocol, with its terrible consequences, in the names of its joint authors; a fathership no one will envy.

General von Bülow, whom a stay of nearly six years at Frankfort had initiated into the grievances of all parties,* and who had witnessed the budding and growing rivalry of the two great German Powers,† was appointed in 1857 Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Courts of Hanover, Schwerin, Strelitz, and Oldenburg, as well as at Bremen, Lübeck, and Hamburg, with residence in the latter town. In his new position it became his chief duty to calm the susceptibilities of the various States bordering on the troublesome Duchies, and it also fell to his lot to co-operate in the abolition of the "Stader Zoll," which was the natural consequence of the example given, a few

* To show what Herr von Bismarck was thinking of the Danish riddle in those days, I may quote the following from a letter of his of September 11th, 1856: "The Diet will, I think, in November devote its sessions to the Holstein question with greater goodwill than results. Outwardly all the Governments will appear united in this matter. Austria will, however, secretly remain an adherent of the Danes; its press will teem with German phrases, and Prussia will be saddled with the error of inaction. The centre of gravity of the affair actually does not lie at Frankfort, but in the question whether Denmark is secure from the assaults of one or more of the 'extra' German States. If she be, then she will look upon the decision of the Diet as a sufficient settlement."—(Hesekiel, "Life of Bismarck," p. 234.)

† It is no secret that, apart from the political side of the question, the personal animosity between Herr von Bismarck and Count Thun, the President of the Diet (*Præsidential Gesandte*), contributed materially to widen the gap between the two Cabinets; but as I shall give a special chapter to this leaf of German history in my sketch on the Prince Chancellor, I will only mention here that Herr von Bülow had the good or bad luck of witnessing the birth of Herr von Bismarck's Austrophobia, and of his first attempts to jib against Austria's hereditary and time-honoured position of *Primus inter pares*.

years previously, by Denmark with respect to the Sound dues;* but Herr von Bülow had the good fortune not to be a party to the vexatious measures which ultimately provoked the rupture between his country and Germany.

To return to the Duchies: it is important to remember that the relations between Copenhagen and Frankfort had become more and more strained since the vote of February 11th, 1858, when the Diet, as it was its undoubted right,† declined recognising the new Danish Constitution, as far as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned, and it can hardly surprise that (although the jurisdiction of the *Bundestag* extended properly only to these parts of the Confederation) Schleswig,‡ the Danish foster-sister

* It may be new that Brazil is the only Power which has never adhered to the international convention which freed merchantmen from the Sound duties, by stipulating that all countries should pay in a lump sum the capitalised amount of the average tolls paid yearly by their ships. Although Brazil's share amounted to hardly £50,000, the Government of our recent guest, His learned Majesty the Emperor Dom Pedro, found it cheaper gratis to enjoy advantages for which we had to pay £1,125,200; surely there ought to exist some international "County Court," before which an aggrieved nation could summon a recalcitrant debtor, without the expense of an Alabama arbitration.

† "The simple question of right is one that admits of no discussion. The title of Germany to interfere between Denmark and the Federal Duchy of Holstein, a member of the Confederation, cannot be contested; nor can the Danish Government be acquitted of certain harsh and imprudent measures, persevered in against friendly remonstrances."—(Sir Alexander Malet, "The Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia, 1866," p. 22.)

‡ It has been erroneously alleged that the Duchy of Schleswig had already been incorporated into Denmark in 1721. King Frederick IV.'s own words refute this notion, for he calls Schleswig in his patents of June 13th, 1725, and June 13th, 1729, "My sovereign

of German Holstein, should have been drawn into the strife,* for we have Lord John Russell's own declaration "that the Constitution of 1855 could have no force in Schleswig;" nay, "that a constitutional connection between Schleswig and Denmark was equivalent to an incorporation of Schleswig." This certainly justifies the protest of the Provincial States of Schleswig, of March 1st, 1860, against the annexation to Denmark, which was so warmly re-echoed throughout Germany, where the indivisibility of Schleswig and Holstein had turned into a sort of national creed.

But here we enter into a new phase, for the moment public opinion coupled the fate of Schleswig with that of Holstein and Lauenburg, the question, heretofore of a purely German character, widened *eo ipso* into an international one; the first impulse in this direction came from the Duke of Coburg,† our Prince Consort's brother; the Prussian Second Chamber followed suit‡ by "unanimously" declaring in favour of an energetic intervention for the protection of the "injured rights," not of Holstein

Duchy of Schleswig;" and likewise he speaks in his message of March 31st, 1724, of "His Royal and Ducal prerogatives;" a term equally used by Christian VI. on March 17th, 1738, and on August 20th, 1740.

* "*La situation de Schleswig a été une situation anormale; car ce Duché a été en union personnelle avec le Danemark, et en union réelle avec l'Allemagne, indirectement par le Holstein.*"—"De la Succession dans la Monarchie danoise," Paris, 1847.)

† Herr von Fritzsche, the Coburg Envoy at Frankfort, moved on March 8th, 1860, "An immediate action of the Diet in this pressing matter."

‡ On May 4th, 1860.

alone, but of Schleswig-Holstein linked together.* From there the contagious enthusiasm spread all over Germany, and the Eider once crossed by popular feeling, despite the old saying, "*Eidora Teutonicum terminat Imperium*," it became impossible to control events. Reason, the first of all duties, is no favourite with the masses, and the German peoples little cared if their clamour for an amalgamation of Danish-Schleswig with Federal-Holstein would or would not provoke the interference of the Great Powers.

Lord Augustus Loftus wrote to Lord John Russell a few days after the vote of the Prussian Chamber :† "As long as the question pending between Germany and Denmark related merely to Holstein, it was a question of purely German character, but when it extended itself to Schleswig it became European ;" and Baron Schleinitz expressed the same views to a deputation of the Prussian Parliament ; but although an appeal of Denmark to the signatories of the Protocol became inevitable,

* A circumstance which recalls the fact that the Emperor Leopold already claimed in 1683 for Germany the right to watch that the *Union* of the Duchies be maintained. Only the Emperor pronounced in favour of Denmark by letting the King-Duke unite the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp's share, with the royal one, as Leibniz confirms in the following words : "*C'est par l'alliance avec l'Empereur qu'il (le Roi de Danemark) a jeté le fondement de sa présente grandeur, car c'est par là qu'il a pu se rendre maître des places du Dür de Holstein sans que l'empire s'en formalisât.*"—("Remarques de Leibniz sur les Nouveaux intérêts des Princes de l'Europe : " O. Klopp, Werke von Leibniz, vol. v. p. 360.)

† Despatch of Lord Augustus Loftus to Lord John Russell, of May 10th, 1860.

it was thought that the same principles which with the sanction of Her Majesty's Government had been applied by the French in Italy, would also guide the Powers in this instance ; and no fears were entertained that Europe would coolly disregard the wishes of the Duchies, and the national pedigree of the inhabitants. Why should the Germans have had any doubts, when their Governments had openly pronounced themselves in favour of their wishes ? for what else could Baron Schleinitz mean when he declared* that although Schleswig did not appertain to the "body" of the German Confederation, the King of Denmark had, as Duke of Schleswig, contracted certain international obligations towards Germany in respect of Schleswig, for the sake of the settlement of the debated claims of Holstein, and that His Majesty was bound to fulfil them ; and when referring to the Prussian memorial of June, 1860, he made use of the following remarkable sentence : "The spirit in which England has so frequently in other places laid its weight in the scale, where it was available, in obtaining liberties for people against their Governments, which until then did not belong to them according to law, and the principles respecting national rights which recently dictated the despatch of Lord John Russell of October 27th, to Sir James Hudson in Turin, will not permit us to doubt that in the case between Denmark and Germany, in

* Despatch of November 8th, 1866, to Count Bernstorff, who was instructed to communicate the same to Lord John Russell.

which the question now is to defend the well-founded and documentary liberties of the States, Great Britain will have no hesitation to use its whole influence with the Cabinet of Copenhagen for obtaining what is right"?

Logical reasoning which contains a bitter satire on the one-sided provisions of the Protocol of 1852, to which Prussia had herself been a party, and conclusions which admirably illustrate the situation and the "national" line Prussia was taking in the matter.

In those days political honesty was still inscribed on the Prussian banner, and the present Emperor, then only Prince of Prussia, refused to listen to Napoleon III.'s tempting suggestion at Baden-Baden* to take Holstein for Prussia, replying dryly, "*Je n'ai pas de mission politique de mon frère*," whilst King Frederick William IV.'s indignation at such a "dishonourable" proposal was re-echoed in the interviews of Baron Schleinitz with Lord Augustus Loftus, as well as in his despatches to Count Bernstorff, to whom he wrote:† "That it was an error to suppose that Prussia or Germany coveted or meditated an acquisition of anything, and that there was no intention to endanger the integrity or independence of the Danish Monarchy."

Well sounding phrases in which the Prussian Minister at the time may have believed, but little in harmony with the daily increasing national

* In 1858.

† Despatch to Count Bernstorff, December, 1860.

spirit; for common sense indicated that the undeniable rights of Germany and the tendencies of the Danish Monarchy (*Gesammt Monarchie*) were political contradictions, and that nothing but a bold amputation in one sense or the other would be able to cure the evil.

The duties of the Great Powers were in this respect but too clearly defined, and although Lord John, in his reply to the Prussian note, protested against any analogy between Italian and German aspirations, he admitted the principle of nationalities in a despatch to Lord Bloomfield;* for he wrote: "The proposal made some years ago by Lord Palmerston† that Schleswig should be divided into a Danish and German portion, was in itself a just and equitable proposition. *But as it will not be listened to by any Danish statesman*, it might be considered whether in the spirit of that proposal the debatable land, as it may be called, might not be narrowed, that is to say, whether a portion might not be considered the Danish division, another the German division, and a third portion the mixed division."

In his despatches to Mr. Lowther and Mr. Paget,‡ Lord John went even further, for he said distinctly to the latter: "You will observe that I have stated

* Despatch of Lord John Russell to Lord Bloomfield, Nov. 6th, 1860.

† In Lord Palmerston's despatch to Chevalier Bunsen of June 23rd, 1848.

‡ Despatches of Lord John Russell to Mr. Lowther, our Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, and to Mr. Paget, our Minister at Copenhagen, both of Dec. 8th, 1860.

in the despatch (to Mr. Lowther) the engagements which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, His Danish Majesty is *bound in honour* to fulfil. He is bound, I have stated, not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark ; to maintain in Schleswig Representative States, and to protect the *German and Danish nationalities* in Schleswig." And in his despatch to Mr. Lowther, his lordship specified still more the Danish obligations, saying : " Next as to the nature of the promises made, these are : 1st. The King of Denmark promises that there should be no incorporation of the Duchy of Schleswig with the kingdom, *nor should any measure tending thereto be adopted* ; 2nd. The Proclamation of the 23rd of January, 1852, promises a constitutional development of the State of Schleswig and there can be no doubt in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that these promises constitute an engagement which His Danish Majesty is *bound in honour* to fulfil."

That the suggestion of a division of Schleswig into a Danish and a German portion would have had the support of other Cabinets is certain, for Baron Schleinitz told Mr. Disraeli at the time "that he (the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs) rejoiced in thinking that this idea would be turned to good account ;" whilst Herr von Bismarck, in those days Minister at St. Petersburg, seemed likewise to view it favourably ; that, moreover, this "just and equitable" proposition, as Lord John called it, was the only possible one, Article V.

of the Treaty of Prague has shown in the sequel. It is therefore incomprehensible that Lord John Russell, so prone to lecture Foreign Governments, should have humbly pocketed a rebuff simply because "no Danish statesman would listen to the proposal," and it is not too much to say that his unpardonable weakness in this instance has been the chief source of all future complications, for at that moment it would have been comparatively easy to impose upon Denmark and the Diet the collective will of those Powers who had originated the whole controversy by the undefined nature of the stipulations of 1852, and whose duty therefore it plainly was to prevent a collision between opposed interests, threatened by the ill-advised obstinacy of the Danish Cabinet and people, and by the exaggerated demands of over-excited Germany.

It was during these days of supreme irresolution and political vacillation that Herr von Bülow was sent to Vienna; and there is every reason to think that, backed up by Lord Bloomfield, the Danish Representative at the Austrian Court might have had a beneficial influence on the decisions of the Imperial Cabinet, and on the ultimate turn of affairs, had not the evil star of Denmark induced the King's advisers only to negotiate *vis-à-vis* Berlin.*

* "Count Rechberg," so reported Lord Bloomfield on Dec. 19th, 1861, to Earl Russell, "seems desirous to do everything in his power to promote the success of the negotiations, but H. E., as your lordship is aware, leaves the management of them entirely in the hands of Prussia."

A despatch which confirms the well-known fact that the Danish

Moreover the French Ambassador at Vienna, the Duc de Gramont, was well disposed ; and although the Emperor Napoleon's attitude had been one of spiteful reserve, to revenge himself for our apparent indifference in the Polish question, there is no doubt that His Majesty's personal sympathy was with the Danish Monarch, as, like King Frederick, he had to struggle against the unpleasant pressure of an unruly, unreasonable and too radical majority in the Chamber ; besides the Emperor would willingly have supported any scheme likely to sow discord between Austria and Prussia, as he was in no way anxious to witness a German illustration of his own pet theory of the natural gravitation of nationalities, which it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for him to oppose in Germany, after having started and patronised the same in Italy.

Taking therefore into consideration the friendly dispositions of both Count Rechberg and the Duc de Gramont, there can be no doubt that Vienna would have been the best centre for diplomatic action ; but the Danish Foreign Office chose Berlin, under the misconception of having there in Herr von Bismarck an *amicus curiæ*, on account of his intimate relations with the Danish statesman Baron Blixen Finecke, a friendship dating from their college years, and on which some over-sanguine Danish

Cabinet was not even in direct communication with the Austrian Foreign Office, and that the whole matter of the Duchies was treated in the *Wilhelmstrasse* by the Prussian authorities, and Herr von Quaade.

patriots had erected a rather fragile edifice of hopes and expectations.

To Denmark's additional misfortune, Lord John's versatile pen indulged once more in a change of front, and after first having declared that Denmark was "in honour bound" to fulfil the "just and equitable" demands of the Confederation, he now advised Germany to abstain from a federal execution, "as Great Britain could not fail to be disturbed by such results ;"* thus naturally filling Denmark with new hopes, and indirectly inciting her to defy the Diet. It was like saying to a man "You break the law," and then threatening the jury with the gallows should they convict. At any rate, what other conclusion could the Danish Cabinet draw from such language, but that England's sword would be found at the bottom of Lord John's overflowing ink-stand ? and we must make an additional allowance for the strong current of national feeling, both in Denmark and Germany, which Lord John seemed quite to have overlooked. At home the humble servant of that powerful autocrat "Public opinion," he forgot that Continental Cabinets had equally to shape their policy according to the will of the "Sovereign of Sovereigns," and instead of using his influence to calm the excitement in the two hostile camps, he stirred it by an alternate encouragement of both.

* Despatch of Lord John Russell to Lord Augustus Loftus of June 20th, 1861.

He perfectly knew the state of the public mind in both countries ; he had admitted the righteousness of the German claims ; and utterances such as those of Baron Beust, on January 7th, 1861, in the Saxon Chambers, indicated that the minor States would all vote and march with their leaders. Under the circumstances it would have been only fair to both sides had Lord John boldly declared, "England stands by Denmark ; her independence and integrity are of concern to us, and we do not care for the question of abstract right and rights, but only for what suits best our interests and those of Europe at large ;" that would have been manly and straightforward, whilst, if not disposed to back his words with the sword, it would have been charitable openly to have told Denmark that she would be left to her fate, if persisting in an arbitrary treatment of her Federal obligations.

In that case it is not likely that the Danish people and statesmen would have been mad enough to throw the glove to the Confederation, and before facing, single-handed, not only the armies of Germany, but also the displeasure of the signatory Powers of 1852, they would have considered the not unreasonable proposal of a *personal union* of the Duchies with Denmark, instead of rejecting this political *pis-aller* as unacceptable.

Of course on this point opinions differ, and in justice to the Danish view of the question, I think it right to quote from the very able book of Mr.

Gosch,* who says: "At last the Diet demanded for the states of Holstein a power by which the whole monarchy would be subject exclusively to the dictates of this local assembly. And this demand the Diet threatens to enforce by military measures, at the same time not dissimulating that the eventual execution in Holstein would be made use of, just as in 1851, in order to obtain influence upon the position of the non-federal parts of the Danish state. In this policy Germany has been not a little encouraged by the circumstances that the other European Powers have hitherto tried to avoid the danger connected with the outbreak of a war between Denmark and Germany, by pressing on Denmark as the weaker part. . . . The source of all these complications is the double relation of Holstein to the Danish Monarchy and to the Germanic Confederation. . . . But for the double position of Holstein, Denmark would not have had to discuss her constitutional laws with foreign Powers, and to see them impeached in Frankfort. If Germany had not been able to create and to keep open a Holstein question, the agitation in Schleswig would have subsided long ago. The only radical remedy would be the entire abolition of the double position of Holstein, and this might be effected in two ways, by a whole-state organisation, when Holstein and Lauenburg must cease to belong to the German Confederation . . . or by the establish-

* "Denmark and Germany since 1815," Charles A. Gosch, pp. 297, et seq.

ment of a separate constitution for Holstein, leaving it in its present connection with Germany, but restricting its constitutional community with the non-federal parts of the monarchy to the common dynasty, the foreign relations, perhaps a common system of customs, and a few other matters." And after saying that he does not think that the Treaty of London requires more than that all the lands united under the sceptre of the Danish King should also for the future be united under one sovereign, whatever be the form of their union, Mr. Gosch continues: "We do not think that there would be reason for anticipating a dynastic separation as a consequence of a constitutional isolation of Holstein. The Schleswig-Holstein scheme is incompatible with the Treaty of London, because it is bound up with the Augustenburg pretensions of succession, and with German plans of conquest; but an isolation of Holstein would have no accessories of this kind. It would be an effectual bar to the designs of Germany on Schleswig, and when once the agitation on this subject had subsided, the Holsteiners would soon perceive the advantages of remaining in connection with Denmark. . . . But whatever form may be chosen for the solution of the Holstein question, one thing is imperatively necessary, if the main purpose of the settlement is not to be defeated. Denmark must not be called upon to make concessions to the German interests in Schleswig. This Duchy has never been part of Germany. . . . Any arrangement

by which the right of the Danish nation to settle its own internal affairs north of the Elder is modified for the sake of reconciling Germany would be a sacrifice of indisputable rights to the mere demand of the more powerful party, and the sanctioning of a principle which is inimical to the first conditions of order and public peace. The other Powers of Europe will soon find it necessary, once for all, to put an end to this long-winded struggle, as they might have done in 1848, or in 1851 ; but they will never succeed till they have decided to support the one of the contending parties who is in the right, and to counteract the other who is in the wrong. It would be *futile* to attempt a solution by trying to satisfy or to discontent both parties equally."

Having given this dispassionate view of a Danish patriot, we shall now see how the Powers, and chiefly our own Foreign Office, attempted the very solution which Mr. Gosch has so well christened "*futile*."

Approved and adopted by the Diet on March 27th, the identical notes of Austria and Prussia* clearly defined the position, and the possible consequences of the Danish attitude ; and as Denmark appealed on March 12th to the Courts of London, Paris, St. Petersburg, Stockholm and the Hague,† there would

* Of December 5th, 1861, and February 14th, 1862.

† A protest which met with a measured but not less confuting reply from the Great German Powers on respectively the 22nd and 25th of August, 1862.

have been a rare opportunity for a united pressure and a diplomatic coercion ; instead of that Lord John resorted once more to a mediation of a less imperative nature, and although proposing a decidedly fair settlement, from a cosmopolitan point of view, he might have spared himself the trouble, unless prepared to add " that Denmark *must* either accept or bide the consequences of a refusal ;" for he knew, as we have seen in the preceding pages, how distastefully any concessions with regard to Schleswig were viewed at Copenhagen.

However, as a *résumé* of the then opinion of our Government, Lord John's despatch of September 24th, 1862, to Mr. Fane, is so important, that I cannot resist giving an extract : " Not having been accepted by the Duchies, the constitution of 1855 has no force in Holstein, Lauenburg, and *Schleswig*. . . . The *obligations of honour* Contracted by Denmark towards Schleswig, and imparted to the German Confederation as such by the King of Denmark in 1852, chiefly regard two points. The first of these is the royal promise that Schleswig shall not be incorporated with Denmark. The second is, in substance, an engagement that the Germans in Schleswig shall be treated on an equal footing with persons of Danish or any other nationality the best mode, therefore, of remedying these evils for the present, and of preventing complaints for the future, is to grant a complete autonomy to Schleswig. . . . " And he concluded : " The suggestions I have made may be summed up in a few words. 1. Holstein

and Lauenburg to have all that the German Confederation asks for them. 2. Schleswig to have the power of self-government and *not* to be represented in the Rigsraad. 3. A normal budget to be agreed upon by Denmark, Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig. 4. Any extraordinary expenditure to be submitted to the Rigsraad and to the separate Diets of Holstein, Lauenburg, and Schleswig."

And a few months later* Earl Russell confirmed the above by saying: "It will not be denied that the King of Denmark holds the Duchy of Holstein as Duke of Holstein, and Lauenburg as Duke of Lauenburg; and that in both capacities he is a member of the German Confederation, bound by its laws, and amenable to the authorities constituted by the Federal act. Neither can it be denied† that, as Duke of Schleswig, the King of Denmark is bound to Austria and Prussia, and to the German Confederation collectively, as sovereign states of Europe, by certain promises made in 1851, and which (as Mr. Hall reminds me) I have always stated his Danish Majesty is bound in honour to fulfil."

That the Duchies would have gladly welcomed this solution is out of the question; for we have only to remember the temperate address of the States, unanimously voted on the motion of Baron Adolphe Blome‡ on February 18th, 1863; further-

* Despatch of Earl Russell to Mr. Paget of November 20th, 1862.

† But, as we have seen, it was from the Danish side.

‡ The late Baron Blome, for some time Danish Minister at our Court, was the highly respected leader of the Holstein party, and known as one of the most conscientious and moderate politicians.

more the memorandum* of Baron Plessen, the President of the Holstein Diet, who strongly recommended the adoption of Lord John Russell's proposals of September 24th, 1862, and finally their appeal† at Frankfort for protection of the rights and interests of Holstein, which asked for nothing more than Lord John had proposed.

As both Prince Gortschakoff and Monsieur Thouvenel were supporting this programme,‡ and the German Powers accepting Earl Russell's mediation on the proposed basis,§ it was surely a lamentable weakness to allow Denmark emphatically to reject it;|| and considering that Lord Russell believed his proposal to be "the most favourable for the independence and integrity of Denmark,"¶ it would have been acting in the spirit of the stipulations of 1852, to impose the collective will of the Powers and to show some

* See State Papers, 1863.

† In consequence of the Danish reply to the address, Baron A. Blome announced on February 28th, 1863, his intention to move an appeal to the German Confederation, and on March 7th, this unanimously voted memorial was presented at Frankfort.

‡ Sweden shared similar views; for on January 22nd, 1863, Count Manderström, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to Count Wachtmeister as follows, instructing him to read the despatch to Lord John: "*Nous croyons toujours*" (for the Swedish Foreign Office had expressed the same opinion already in March and May, 1861), "*que la seule solution pratique consiste dans une séparation administrative complète des Duchés allemands du reste de la Monarchie danoise, tout en sauvegardant soigneusement les droits de la Confédération germanique par rapport aux provinces qui appartiennent à ce corps d'état.*"

§ On September 27th and October 29th, 1862.

|| On October 15th and November 5th, 1862.

¶ Despatch of Lord John Russell to Mr. Fane, of November 20th, 1862.

earnestness of purpose, instead of complicating matters by meddling advice on one side, and illogical bullying on the other.

The result we know; for, convinced that Earl Russell would not allow Germany to go to *extremis*, Denmark adopted a more and more defiant bearing; and when at this juncture the marriage* of H. R. H. the Prince of Wales came like a ray of hope, not only the Danes, not only the friends of Denmark in this country, but all true lovers of peace, thought that this popular alliance, in which we can trace the wise and guiding hand of the lamented Prince Consort, would cement the friendly relations between Great Britain and her *protégé*, and that now little Denmark would no longer be left to her fate in an absurd conflict between international and federal duties;† but that we should put an end to all cavilling over abstract rights by only consulting the common interests of Europe, so closely linked to the integrity and independence of the Danish Monarchy.

But popular as such an interpretation of our duties towards Denmark would have been throughout the realm, bold “actions” were not in Earl Russell’s nature, and the sanguine expectations of the people here and in Denmark soon vanished into nought.

Pressed by the National Liberals, the Cabinet of Copenhagen pursued a policy greatly provoking

* March 10th, 1863.

† *Bundespflichten*.

to Germany, and the Royal Ordonnances of March 30th, 1863, were simply adding fuel to the fire, as, to use Earl Russell's own words, they were "equivalent to an incorporation of Schleswig." To which his lordship added, "that he considered as the necessary complement of the autonomy of Holstein, the correspondent autonomy of Schleswig, *which* was not to be represented in the Rigsraad," whilst, on the contrary, the Ordonnances were leaving Schleswig in the *Reichsrath*, maintaining the common Constitution of 1855, and that contrary to the promises of 1851, which the English Government considered the King *bound in honour* to fulfil.

What more could a statesman say in favour of the German demands?

Yet, after having indicated the only "possible remedy," our Foreign Secretary allowed its application to be optional, until there remained no other cure but an amputation, so easily avoidable in the beginning.

No one will deny that, under the circumstances, it was a serious mistake of the Danish Government to have ventured upon so hazardous an experiment, not only without the concurrence, nay, against the outspoken will of Germany, but even without having made sure of the support of the Great Powers; for naturally the Cabinet of Copenhagen must have anticipated that a violent protest would be raised against a measure which was to sever the recognised judicial, administrative, and representative relationship of the two sister

Duchies,* and that contrary to the interests of the realm, and in opposition to the Danish ideas of the day, if we consult the opinions of Danish statesmen of the old school, such as Bang, Rühl, Örsted.† Moreover, the Danish Government must have been fully aware that at last the Diet would be driven to resort to the so-much-talked-of Federal Execution,‡ as already foreshadowed two years previously in the King of Prussia's speech when closing

* As this relationship is denied by modern Danish statesmen and writers (see Charles A. Gosch's "Denmark and Germany," p. 245, et seq.), I will mention in its support that when the royal and ducal parts of Holstein were united, a decree of the King-Duke, of 1768, ordered that all natives of Schleswig and Holstein who wished for appointments "in civilibus or ecclesiasticis" should study for two years at the Holstein University of Kiel, founded, in 1665, by Duke Christian Albrecht of Holstein-Gottorp; and that, moreover, justice was administered in Schleswig, as well as in Holstein, according to common German law and the "*Halsgerichts Ordnung of the Emperor Charles V.*," the "*Lov*" (law) of Jutland having been suspended in 1683.

† Minister Bang said, in 1838, in the Parliament of Roeskilde, "that it was a political untruth (*unrichtig*) that the States of the Duchies were separate, adding "that the Duchy of Schleswig had an independent character, being a separated part of the kingdom of Denmark (*ein abgesondertes Staatsglied*), and united by the most intimate connection with Holstein."

The Danish historian Rühl said, "that to separate Schleswig and Holstein would be attempting their life;" and the well-known Minister Oerstedt concurred in these views, by expressing, in 1842, in the Parliament of Viborg, the hope "that the relations between Schleswig and Holstein would be maintained, so as to let Schleswig be the connecting link between Holstein and Denmark—a connection so important that the Monarchy would suffer greatly if any separation took place," an opinion which he reiterated in 1850, when saying "that the connection of the Duchies rested on principles which could not be touched without upsetting the entire rights (*Rechtszustand*) of the Duchies."

‡ In accordance with Article III. of the Federal Constitution (*Bundes Executions Ordnung*).

the parliamentary session of 1861; and one cannot help thinking that Denmark, when taking this impolitic step* in full knowledge of the consequences, must have been guided by the *arrière pensée* that at the first shot fired we should help her out of her troubles—chimerical hopes which find their excuse in the inconsistency of Earl Russell's dealings.

An endless exchange of diplomatic despatches formed the prelude, and contributed necessarily to envenom the already overstrained relations of Denmark and Germany.

In no way satisfied with the Danish justification of the Ordonnances, Austria and Prussia referred† the Cabinet of Copenhagen to the negotiations at Frankfort, and to the resolutions of Hanover§ and Oldenburg, adopted by the Diet on July 9th,|| to

* Count Platen, the Hanoverian Minister of Foreign Affairs, told Sir Henry Howard "that such a total separation of Holstein from the remainder of the Monarchy would be a most *impolitic* step, and would probably lead, sooner or later, to the loss of that Duchy by Denmark."—(Despatch of Sir H. Howard to Earl Russell, April 11th, 1863.)

† Despatch of Mr. Hall, the Danish Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, of May 16th, 1863, to the Danish Ministers at Vienna and Berlin.

‡ On May 23—30, 1863.

§ With reference to this motion, brought before the Diet on April 23—30, Earl Russell wrote, on May 13th, to Mr. Petre, our Chargé d'Affaires at Hanover: "I have received your despatch of the 1st instant, relative to the recent deliberations of the Frankfort Diet upon the Schleswig-Holstein question. Her Majesty's Government are happy to find that the views of Hanover are moderate."

|| Special reference being made to her previous resolutions of February 11th and August 12th, 1858, March 8th, 1860, and February 7th, 1861, the Diet stated that Denmark had not only acted contrary to the Federal decrees, but that the Ordonnances of March 30th in-

which Minister Hall replied, "that his Government had had sufficient opportunities for expressing itself on the subject of the claims brought forward by the German Confederation with respect to Schleswig, and on the form in which they had been asserted, and that he could only refer to his previous declaration and protests"—a rather curt fashion *de non recevoir*, and hardly conducive to an amiable settlement, when we add to it the Danish declaration made in Frankfort on August 27th, which pointed out that the charter of June 11th, 1854, had given Holstein what was required, and that having recognised the political autonomy of Holstein and Lauenburg, these Duchies had nothing to complain of.

But to make matters still worse, the Danish

dictated the intentions of the Danish Government not to obey the same, particularly by endeavouring to give Holstein a position openly in contradiction with the agreement sanctioned by the Diet on July 29th, 1852, and by disregarding the Royal Manifesto of July 14th, 1850, and the Danish Notification of January 28th, 1852, as well as the corollary undertaking given on January 29th, 1852, to the Courts of Austria and Prussia, as mandatories of the German Confederation, *not to incorporate Schleswig, or to take any steps leading thereto*. Should, therefore, Denmark persist in the provision of the Ordonnances of March 30th, the Diet would be obliged to seek a redress for the injured rights of Holstein and Lauenburg in an execution; whilst with regard to Schleswig, she would have recourse to such measures as would insure the rights acquired by international agreement; adding that, sharing the views of Austria and Prussia, the Diet would have been disposed to accept the proposals made by the English Government in September as a basis for an understanding had Denmark unreservedly accepted the mediation.

° Despatch of Prime Minister Hall, of July 17th, 1863, to Baron Brenner, the Austrian, and Herr von Balan, the Prussian Minister at Copenhagen (Sjette Samling af Actstykker angaaende Hertugdømmene Holsteen og Lauenborgs Forfatningsforhold).

Government laid, on September 29th, a new Constitution before the *Rigsraad*,* based on the Patent of March 30th, and completing the incorporation of Schleswig, regardless of the advice of the Great Powers, of the protests of the German people and Governments, and in spite of the serious aspect of the situation.

After Earl Russell's unambiguous admonitions, such a daring step on the part of Denmark might have caused surprise, but the possible effect was paralysed by the threatening tone of his despatches to the Diet, to Austria, Prussia, and to the minor Courts; and when we look at the warlike prose of his lordship in those critical days, the Danish statesmen may be pardoned for having taken the Earl's political moulting *au sérieux*.

On the other hand, how could Germany be expected to recede from demands so recently acknowledged as "equitable and just?" Matters were at that time too far advanced, public opinion had pronounced, and the German people, and in their wake the Governments, exasperated by an obstinate resistance to their just claims, were drifting into the dangerous but natural course of confounding rights and wishes, and, regardless of the interests of Denmark and Europe, of allowing themselves only to be guided by those of the Fatherland.

Earl Russell's suggestion, "that the two Powers

* Voted on November 13th, the new Constitution was to take life on January 1st, 1864.

(England and France) might remind Austria, Prussia, and the German Diet that any act on their part tending to weaken the integrity and independence of Denmark would be at variance with the Treaty of May 8th, 1852,* had no other practical bearing but to irritate; and as already in August three hundred members and ex-members of various German Parliaments had expressed the feelings of the nation by voting to uphold the rights of the Duchies and the succession of the House of Augustenburg, in case of the death of His Majesty King Frederick VII., it was no longer in the power of the German Cabinets, even had they wished it—and they did not—to abandon the Duchies, and to allow this unfortunate question to be taken out of their hands (as in 1848), by turbulent revolutionary elements; and that would necessarily have been the result had the Governments declined to interfere.

All that could be done was to restrict Germany to legal means, and to the lawful object in view, and, from a Federal point, no fault can be found with the Note of October 1st,† when the Diet decided unanimously‡ upon the Federal execution, and commis-

* Despatch of Earl Russell to Mr. Grey, of September 16th, 1863.

† The motion for Federal execution was brought in by Hanover on April 23rd, 1863. Very moderate, it recommended in the preamble Earl Russell's proposals of September 24th, 1862, and demanding in no way the reunion of Schleswig and Holstein, it only insisted upon such rights respecting Schleswig as had been stipulated by the international agreements of 1851–52.

‡ Denmark, for Holstein and Lauenburg, and Holland, for Luxemburg, abstaining from the vote.

sioned Austria, Prussia, Saxony, and Hanover to act in its name.

Earl Russell's declaration ("that Her Majesty's Government could not see with indifference a military occupation of Holstein, which was only to cease upon terms injuriously affecting the constitution of the whole Danish Monarchy," and that "Her Majesty's Government could not recognise this military occupation as a legitimate exercise of the powers of the Confederation, or admit that it could properly be called a Federal execution"*), even had it reached the Diet in time, would hardly have influenced its decisions, for when laid before the august Assembly, on October 22nd, the President, Baron Kübeck, was requested to inform Sir Alexander Malet that the Diet could not take Lord Russell's communication into consideration; the Committee, in a lengthy argument, laying particular stress on the fact that the Diet would not allow an interference of Foreign Powers into purely Federal matters. Earl Russell's despatch of October the 14th, to which was joined a copy of his despatch of May 27th to our representatives at Vienna and Berlin,† which reached Frankfort about the same

* Despatch of Earl Russell to Sir A. Malet, of September 29th, 1863.

† "Her Majesty's Government have heard with much concern that it is in contemplation to consider, in the Diet at Frankfort, a Federal execution in Holstein. Without discussing the declaration of the King of Denmark, of the 30th of March, 1863, they instruct you to say that it is very desirable not to add to the existing complications and dangers of Europe. Austria and Prussia declined, in

time, fared no better, although his lordship seemed less dictatorial in his language, and indicating a possible yielding of the Danish Government with respect to the Patent of March 30th, assured the Diet "that Her Majesty's Government fully admit the claims of the Confederation in Holstein and Lauenburg. But they believe that if the demands of the Diet were limited to these German Duchies, those demands might be satisfied without Federal execution."

A third despatch gave way still more ; for, discarding the idea of an arbitration, his lordship suggested leaving all German matters to the Confederation, and the international differences to the mediation of a friendly Power. At the same time, Earl Russell told Denmark "that, with due regard for her own interest, she should at once withdraw the Patent of March 30th, and rest her opposition to Federal execution on the ground that it involved an interference in matters relating to the Constitution of the Danish Monarchy and in the affairs of Schleswig ;"* thus preaching to one, blaming the other—threatening the former, encouraging the latter, and dissatisfying both ; whereas an openly declared support of one side would have cleared the situation.

1861, to negotiate the affairs of Holstein without arranging those of Schleswig. But the affairs of Schleswig are matters of international concern, and should be discussed with the utmost calmness and deliberation by the Powers of Europe, and cannot be decided by the Diet of Frankfort."—(Despatch of Earl Russell, of May 27th.)

* Despatch of Earl Russell to Sir A. Paget, of October 21st, 1863.

But whilst we have recorded Earl Russell's mischievous interference up to the critical moment of the occupation of Holstein by the Federal armies, there remains the task of scrutinising Herr von Bismarck's attitude, the attitude of the *deus ex machina* of the future catastrophe. It is his share in the preliminaries which will best give an idea of the events of 1864, and how, as their sequel, those of 1866 could have been avoided.

There is no doubt that the Diet, that Austria, and the minor German Governments, were acting *bonâ fide*, and in the belief that really German rights were in jeopardy, that their protection was the object and the final aim of the execution, and that Germany was "in honour bound" not to abandon the two German Duchies. Thus Sir Alexander Malet reported, "that all intentions of interfering with Schleswig or with the Constitution of Denmark were disavowed, but that the Federal rights in respect to Holstein and Lauenburg were upheld, and that the right of foreign intervention in what was asserted to be purely Federal matter was denied;"* Lord Bloomfield, writing from Vienna, said that Count Rechberg had told him "that Germany was not going to make war, that Federal execution was not war . . . and that, with regard to the Treaty of 1852, Austria and Prussia must take the consequences of it, but their policy would be inseparable from that of Germany."† And Lord

* Sir Alexander Malet to Earl Russell, October 23rd, 1863.

† Lord Bloomfield to Earl Russell, October 22nd, 1863.

Augustus Loftus added to it Herr von Schrenk the Bavarian Minister's opinion, "that Germany could not now recede from the decision it had taken without incurring dishonour and discredit, both in the eyes of Europe and of the German nation."* We shall see how far Herr von Bismarck shared the quixotic ideas of his colleagues, or rather how he made use of them for his own purposes and ends. Absorbed, when first taking office, by the interior dissensions in the Prussian Chamber, all his energies had necessarily been concentrated in effecting the King's great military reorganisation, for which the Opposition refused so obstinately the necessary funds.†

However the moment the Prussian Premier saw the possible danger of a second edition of the troubles of 1848, he determined on not letting the people again take the lead in the Danish or Schleswig-Holstein question; and hardly realising in the beginning what advantages would accrue to his country by a clever manipulation of other people's mistakes and blunders, he contented himself with

* Lord Augustus Loftus to Earl Russell, October 27th, 1863.

† The author remembers meeting Herr von Bismarck one day during that critical period *Unter den Linden*. The Minister-President, as he was styled, had just left the palace, and seemed in high spirits. "Fancy," said he, "Forkenbeck" (the President of the present Reichstag, to whom Prince Bismarck offered lately a portfolio, but in those days the leader of the Opposition) "and his set have offered the King to vote the funds for the army reorganisation on the condition of dismissing me, and to let them form a Cabinet. But I have told His Majesty, 'Wait, and you'll get a better price for me.'"—*Würten Sie Majestät, Sie können einen besseren Preiss für mich kriegen.*

suggesting a Conference* as the best way of settling the difficulties, a proposal, as I stated before, which unfortunately was not listened to.

The President of the Prussian Ministry hoped thus to win time and to watch the turn of affairs, and although he was far from approving the political foolhardiness of Denmark, the whole question seemed to affect him less than most Germans; and as late as October, 1863, he declared to Sir Andrew Buchanan, "that he had never shared in the excitement with which the Schleswig-Holstein question was treated in Germany," adding however, "that he must be guided by public opinion." On another occasion he assured Sir Andrew "that he considered all danger would pass, if only Denmark would yield to the demands of the German Diet respecting Holstein; an execution being then no longer possible, as surely no one would go to war for the other part of the question" (*i.e.* Schleswig.)†

He expressed himself in a similar way to Herr von Quaade, who was full of the Prussian Premier's impartiality and friendly dispositions, and wrote home "that he had every reason to believe that Herr von Bismarck would not object to the Eider as a political line of demarcation."‡

* Despatch of Sir Andrew Buchanan to Lord John Russell, March 30th, 1863.

† Herr von Bismarck's *ipsissima verba*.

‡ Despatch of Herr von Quaade of Oct. 28th, 1863.

But Herr von Bismarck went still farther, for when the Danish Envoy mentioned to him that Count Bernstorff (his predecessor in the Wilhelmstrasse) had repeatedly declared "that the question of Holstein could *only* be solved jointly with the Schleswig one," Herr von Bismarck replied "that Count Bernstorff's opinion could have no longer any weight;"* and he expressed to Herr von Quaade his wish to see Denmark preserve a peaceful attitude, even after the Diet's threat of execution, so as to leave an opening for conciliation. Nay, in his famous speech of December 1st, 1863, in the Prussian Chambers, he said: "So long as the London treaty is not to be considered void, *we* regard King Christian as the heir of the rights belonging to, as well as the wrongs inflicted by, his predecessors. . . . Whatever decision may be come to at Frankfort, Prussia will under all circumstances, in conformity with her position as a European Power, and as a member of the German Confederation, calmly but firmly maintain the rights of Germany in the Duchies, and her own position in the council of the Great Powers."

Hence there is not the slightest doubt that the attitude of the Prussian Premier was, until the end of 1863, not only conciliatory, but even friendly towards Denmark, who ought not to have allowed so favourable an occasion to slip for obtaining acceptable terms, as great statesmen are like pretty

* "*Graf Bernstorff's Aussichten können keine Bedeutung irgendwie mehr haben.*"

women, and never give one twice the chance of a weak moment.

Of course when the obstinacy of Denmark and the popular frenzy of the Germans left him no choice but either to put Prussia at the head of the movement or to let Austria reap the benefits of a national policy, he did not hesitate a moment, and taking in hand the whole negotiations with Denmark, we soon see him take at Frankfort a position which clearly indicated that if no one else knew what was wanted and where he was going to, that he, at least, did. Those who have taken the trouble closely to watch the intricate meshes of this wonderful Prussian cobweb, will agree that Bismarck showed himself a master of political strategy, only second perhaps to Count Cavour in his unrivalled talent of making everything and everybody subservient to one great, patriotic aim.

The vote for the Federal execution in Holstein, and later on the extension of the Federal sway towards Schleswig, gave Herr von Bismarck capital opportunities for testing the shaky machinery of the *Bund*, as well as the rival influence of Austria, and the value of international treaties—and threats; and when, jointly with Austria, he moved at the *Bund* to seize Schleswig as a pledge for the execution of the Danish engagements of 1851—52,* his programme was ripe.

To complicate matters, the death of King Frederick

* Forty-fourth sitting of the Diet; Dec. 28th, 1863.

took place at this juncture,* and the accession of His Majesty King Christian IX., in accordance with the law of succession of July 31st, 1853, became the signal for renewed agitation in the Duchies, as the Duke of Augustenburg naturally came forward to claim what, supported by the Governments of Saxony, Bavaria, Hesse and others, the unfortunate Prince was led to believe his lawful right,† a point on which our Envoy at Frankfort, Sir Alexander Malet, expresses himself as follows: "This is not the proper place for discussing the validity of His Highness's claim; but on whatever legal basis it may have been founded, there can be no question but that such right as can be derived from election, and the almost unanimous voice of the people of the Duchies, gave him a title, if all others were wanting, which few Englishmen would feel inclined to dispute."

To make things worse, King Christian confirmed, two days after his accession, the new Constitution, voted under the late King, and which united

* On Nov. 15th, 1863.

† On November 21st, Herr von Dircking-Holmfeld notified the accession of His Majesty King Christian at Frankfort, whilst Herr von Mohl, the Representative of Baden, notified at the same time the accession of the Hereditary Prince of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg, and his father's renunciation, and presented his credentials as representative of the Duke; and as most German Governments, Bavaria foremost, were against the admittance of the King of Denmark's Envoy, Herr von Dircking-Holmfeld had actually to withdraw at the next session on November 28th, Prussia and Austria confining themselves to a protest against the new Danish Constitution, without touching the question of the King-Duke's right to be represented at the Diet.

Schleswig definitively with Denmark; the consequence was that the Ministers of Austria and Prussia threatened to demand their passports, that nine hundred representatives of different German States voted at Frankfort to support the Duke of Augustenburg, insisting upon the indivisibility of the Duchies, and that the last days of 1863 witnessed the occupation of Holstein by Federal troops, and the proclamation of Prince Frederick as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, at Kiel.

These were the rapidly succeeding incidents which inaugurated the reign of the new King. But where was England? where the Great Powers, whose duty, as signatories of the Protocol of 1852, it would have been to prevent the imminent conflict? I fear if we look back, that there is little for us to be proud of, and I have already pointed out what a lamentable influence Earl Russell had been exercising by his warlike penmanship, in misleading Denmark, and exasperating Germany.

Pasting with much ado his famous despatches to Mr. Murray on the shaky signpost of the Holstein frontier, Lord John "Bombastes" challenged the world, or whom it might concern, to touch the stipulations of the Protocol of 1852. He threatened right, he threatened left, he offered his mediation,* he told the Diet that it had no business to vote an execution, he told Prussia "that the new Danish Constitution could never have been adopted had Prussia not neglected *his* advice respecting the

* Despatch of Earl Russell to Sir Alexander Malet, Nov. 18th, 1863.

expediency of not allowing the Holstein question to add to the complications and dangers of Europe." . . . He said that Her Majesty's Government would not interfere, should Federal troops enter Holstein on purely Federal grounds, but that Her Majesty's Government *might be obliged to interfere*, should it appear that Federal troops had entered the Duchy on international grounds;* he hinted at Berlin "that any action on the part of the German Confederation might lead to consequences fatal to the peace of Europe, and might involve Germany, in particular, in difficulties of a most serious nature;† he declared at Frankfort "that it mattered comparatively little in itself whether a Prince of the House of Glücksburg or a Prince of the House of Augustenburg should reign in Holstein or in Schleswig . . . but that it mattered much that the faith of treaties should be maintained, that right and possession should be respected, and that the flames of war should not be spread over Europe by these questions."‡

However, his language altered when Sir Alexander Malet reported§ "that the wish to sever Schleswig from Denmark had taken such root in the German

* Memorandum presented, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, by Sir Andrew Buchanan to Herr von Bismarck, on Nov. 24th, 1863.

† Despatch of Earl Russell to Sir Andrew Buchanan of Dec. 25th, 1863.

‡ Despatch of Earl Russell to Sir Alexander Malet of Dec. 31st, 1863.

§ Despatch of Sir Alexander Malet of Jan. 8th, 1864.

mind, that the project would not be abandoned without extreme reluctance that the tension of the public mind was very great, and that there was a wonderful indifference to the representations of our Government, resented, at the same time, as an interference with a cherished project;" upon our Representative at Frankfort adding, a few days later, "that the scheme for a division of Schleswig, as suggested in 1851-52 by Her Majesty's Government, was often reverted to as likely to gain one of the chief aims of the German agitation;"* and the Emperor of the French expressing, through Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, "his repugnance to any course which should bind him to oppose in arms the wishes of Germany, on account of his great regard for the feelings and aspirations of nationalities, tending in the case of Germany to a closer connection with the Germans of Holstein and Schleswig."† His Lordship became doubtful; and when he saw Austria and Prussia follow the lead of public opinion in Germany,‡ and a barrier of bayonets between his pompous phrases and German grievances, he remembered that discretion was the better part of valour. Making a political somersault, he suddenly

* Despatch of Sir Alexander Malet of Jan. 16th, 1864.

† Despatch of Earl Russell to Earl Cowley of Jan. 30th, 1864.

‡ "It will hardly be thought surprising in England that Her Majesty's Government exercise scarcely any influence in Germany as regards the dispute with Denmark, when it is *evident* that Austria and Prussia, though both their Cabinets are more than inclined to act with moderation, are quite unable at present to stem the popular feelings." (Sir A. Malet to Earl Russell, Dec. 26th, 1863.)

again remembered that he had told the King of Denmark that His Majesty was "in honour bound" to fulfil his Federal and International obligations,† and seeing somewhat late what the Saxon Premier had styled the "*légèreté*" of his attitude, His Lordship retreated once more hastily into his inkstand, and proposed a Conference of the signatories of the Protocol of 1852, with the addition of a Representative of the German Confederation.‡

An excellent idea, to be sure, had it been realised when suggested by Herr von Bismarck the previous year,§ but when nations are drawn up in line, when national feelings are over-excited, when national dignity is at stake, it is more than difficult to conciliate matters round a green table, and the sequel has shown that it is impossible. However, Earl Russell, who abroad had the speciality of warming up other statesmen's ideas at the wrong moment, and who already had been unlucky with Lord Palmerston's capital suggestions respecting North Schleswig,

* Earl Russell's circular despatch of Jan. 21st, 1863, to our Representatives at Paris, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Copenhagen.

† "Her Majesty's Government considered that the King of Denmark was bound to fulfil the engagements of 1851, 1852; but they did not consider that his title to the crown was dependent in any way on the fulfilment of those engagements."—(Earl Russell to Sir A. Malet, Dec. 31st, 1863.)

‡ "I took care to impress upon M. Vedel, that in promising to support Denmark in obtaining a Conference, Her Majesty's Government in no way withdrew from the opinion that the Constitution of November 18th ought to be revoked as regarded Schleswig."—(Lord Wodehouse to Earl Russell, December 29th, 1863.)

§ Despatch of Sir Andrew Buchanan to Earl Russell, of March 30th, 1863.

wanted nevertheless to try the experiment, as the only means of saving our dignity, by screening his lamentable policy behind an international *non possu-mus*.

In the meanwhile matters had taken a still more serious aspect, in consequence of the refusal of the Diet to adopt the joint proposals of Austria and Prussia,* who were determined to act, as they called it, in their capacity of Great Powers; an illogical interpretation of their international attributes, for if the Federal Constitution prescribed an "execution" in certain emergencies, it prohibited members from taking the law into their own hands, and it certainly did not authorise the interference of any Great Power in purely Federal matters;† moreover the reception Lord John Russell's despatches‡ had met with at Frankfort sufficiently indicated the view taken by the Diet; and as Baron Beust had previously pointed out to Mr. Murray,§ Federal decisions and Federal proceedings within the Federal boundaries were no business of third parties, which applied equally (hard as it may appear for the leading Ger-

* Sitting of the Diet on January 14th, 1864.

† Of all German sovereigns, the late King of Hanover was foremost in disapproving of Austria's and Prussia's isolated steps; for, a staunch adherent and supporter of the Federal Constitution, he considered all German governments bound to abide by the Federal compact; it was therefore with serious apprehension that His Majesty viewed the passage of the Austrian and Prussian troops through Hanover, considering such a step a deliberate slight on the *Bund*.

‡ See page 58.

§ Despatch of Baron Beust, the Saxon Premier, to Mr. Murray, January 5th, 1864.

man Powers that they should be outvoted by the minor States), to Austria and Prussia the moment they undertook to act in any other capacity than that of members of the Confederation. An execution was not necessarily war,* whilst the occupation of Holstein by Austrian and Prussian troops was undoubtedly a belligerent act, and was no more justified than if England or France had sent their armies to enforce a decision of the *Bundestag*. At any rate it was a novel proceeding to say to the King of Denmark : " We have come to force you as a member of the German Confederation to submit to the decrees of the Diet, when the very act of doing so, in spite of the *veto* of the same assembly, was on their part not only unconstitutional, in a Federal sense, but simply the *coup-de-grâce* given to the whole federal edifice.

The " order (*Befehl*) " of Herr von Roon, the Prussian Minister of War, to the " Federal " General von Hake,† to place himself under the " *Commando* " of the Prussian Field Marshal von Wrangel,‡ was nothing but the superannuation of the Diet by Prussia ; it was the bold stroke of a military pen through Federal rights, decrees and Constitution. And the reclamations of the Federal Commander-in-Chief, the indignation of the august Assembly at this act of *lèse-Diète*, the childish

* The Austrian, Prussian, Saxon, and Hanoverian troops had been peacefully occupying Holstein *quâ* army of execution since August.

† The Saxon General von Hake was commander-in-chief of the Federal army of execution in Holstein.

‡ Old " Papa Wrangel," who died the other day at the age of ninety-four.

measures of Baron Kisbek,* and the bashful astonishment of the Prussian Government that Herr von Roon should have taken such a "dreadful" liberty with the Federal Commander-in-Chief; in fact, the whole proceedings at Frankfort during that time were of such a burlesque nature, that no doubt a remodelling of the *Bundestag*, once so useful a political *pis-aller*, became necessary;† yet it is difficult to understand how Austria could lend a hand to such systematic attacks on Federal dignity, which, in threatening the very existence of the *Bund*, necessarily undermined at the same time the already strongly shaken authority of the House of Hapsburg at Frankfort.‡

"In this crisis the ability and resources of the Prussian Premier speedily made him master of the

* Baron Kisbek, the President of the Diet (*Präsidential Gesandte*), telegraphed to General von Hake to resist the Prussian demands, but to avoid bloodshed, so that the Federal troops made in consequence a sort of sham retreat before the Prussian bayonets.

† The poor opinion Herr von Bismarck had for many years of the august *Bund*, is charmingly illustrated in one of his private letters from Frankfort in the year 1856: "I permit a spirit of entire indolence to possess me, after having—I flatter myself—gradually brought the Diet to a knowledge of its intense nihilism. The well-known song of Heine, 'O Bund, Du Hund, du bist nicht gesund,' will soon be unanimously adopted by resolution as the national anthem of the Germans."—(Hesekiel's "Life of Bismarck," p. 238.)

‡ The Chevalier de Genty said in 1819: "*Si l'autorité de cette diète est méconnue, si son pouvoir baisse et s'éteint de jour en jour . . . si l'union germanique se réduit à un vain simulacre, il serait contraire à la dignité de l'Autriche de conserver plus longtemps une place sans honneur et sans réalité.*"—(Comte Prokesch-Osten's "Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Genty," vol. i, p. 424.)

situation, and His Excellency effected this in a manner that at once served a threefold purpose. By inducing Austria to participate in the invasion of Denmark (for that was the real intent of the joint operation) not only did the Imperial Government take its full share of the odium attached to the proceeding in Germany and in all the rest of Europe, but M. de Bismarck made use of the rival Power to aid him in gaining a territorial acquisition, which he had predetermined to secure for Prussia, and at the same time made it possible for him to put Austria in the wrong before the European tribunal, in the quarrel which he was contriving to fix upon her.”*

To understand Count Rechberg's policy, it will be well to remember that there was rather an uneasy feeling at Vienna since the *fiasco* of the *Fürstentag*,† and King William's emancipation from Austrian tutelage; neither had the Nürnberg conferences contributed to strengthen the antiquated position of the Power presiding at Frankfort, whilst Prussia's bold attitude clearly indicated that Herr von Bismarck was perfectly capable of taking the lead in the Danish question without any assistance, and of backing his pen with the sword of Frederick the Great; it was therefore thought desirable at the

* Sir Alexander Malet, “Overthrow of the German Confederation,” p. 13.

† The *Fürstentag* at Frankfort, August, 1863, attended by all German sovereigns, save King William and two or three invalids.

Ballplatz to seek for a *rapprochement* with the rising sun.

The Prussian Premier wanted nothing better, Austria's complicity was *conditio sine quâ non* for the success of his fratricidal conceptions, and Count Rechberg's pusillanimous fears of not being able to control public opinion offered Herr von Bismarck a welcome opportunity for exaggerating the agitation in the minor States in favour of *Schleswig-Holstein Meerumschlungen*, and for unearthing the imaginary spectre of a possible German revolution,* which could only, as he cleverly suggested, be paralysed by a quick and joint action of the two Great German Powers, and by entirely taking the whole matter out of the hands of the Diet. The plausible arguments of Herr von Bismarck easily convinced the Austrian statesman, who was far from suspecting a trap, and candidly believed that going with Prussia would be protecting the Government of the minor States against radical pressure, and that an Austro-Prussian intervention in the Duchies would deprive insurrectional movements of a wished-for pretext, and revolutionary sympathies of their *raison d'être*.

"Thus go they both together to their geare,
With like fierce minds, but meanings different."

Herr von Bismarck had omitted to tell Count Rechberg that the isolated action of the two leading

* "His fear of democratic influence, which the Austrian statesman most dreaded, had probably the greatest weight in inducing the Imperial Minister to enter into such a fatal combination."—(Sir A. Malet, "Overthrow of the German Confederation," p. 14.)

members would be equal to the dissolution of the Confederation, and the Cabinet of Vienna discovered, only when it was too late, where the Prussian partnership was leading to.

That a strengthening of the *Bund*, and a united action of its members, would have given to the House of Hapsburg a new lease of authority in Germany, did not for a moment strike the Austrian Premier, and meekly grasping the iron hand of his Prussian colleague, with his eyes shut he made a fatal leap into the unknown.

Herr von Bismarck chuckled with delight, and, having no longer to fear a German coalition backed by Austria, he began at once his coveted office of Federal undertaker, and, unmoved by the Conferences of Würzburg, where the leading Ministers of Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg* were making a last effort to save Germany from internal collisions, he no longer hesitated to give his policy in the Duchies a more Prussian shape.

The *Bund* existed, so to say, only on sufferance, and although the Diet continued to hold meetings and to frame resolutions, the latter were as powerless as the Federal armies, since the constitutional execution had been superseded by the arbitrary Austro-Prussian invasion† of the Duchies.

The defeat of Denmark, as the ultimate result of this

* Herr von Schrenk, Baron Beust, and Herr von Hügel.

† Austria and Prussia acting *quà* Great Powers, and no longer as members of the Confederation, the occupation of the Duchies by these armies cannot be called otherwise.

unequal struggle, could easily be anticipated. "M. de Bismarck was previously well-assured of the indifference of France, and could rely with confidence on the Emperor's declared opinion of the nullity of the Treaty of 1852. He was equally well assured that the advisers of the Crown in England would in all likelihood do no more, in case the Conference failed, than tender some of those excellent counsels, of which, in the opinion of continental statesmen,* Her Majesty's Government had been far too lavish."† The division of the spoil was the only question to be solved; it was clear that Denmark would not be able to hold her own against such powerful assailants, and it was certain that she would lose the Duchies, but who was to be the gainer? Evidently neither Germany nor the Duke of Augustenburg, once so warmly supported by the late King of Prussia and by the Prussian Chambers; for now that Herr von Bismarck had the trumps in his hands, he suddenly remembered the Emperor Napoleon's words at Baden-Baden, suggesting the incorporation of Holstein with Prussia, and there even exists a telegram, instructing H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles, the Prussian Commander-in-Chief, to annex Holstein already at that stage of affairs under certain specified

* Sir Alexander Malet tells us in his interesting volume "that he was one day told by Baron von der Pfordten (the Bavarian Envoy at Frankfort, and ultimately Prime Minister at Munich) 'that he looked on Earl Russell's despatches as so much waste paper,' adding, that although he required and received an ample apology for this disrespectful phrase, that the hasty expression was not the less sincere."

† Sir A. Malet, "Overthrow of the German Confederation," p. 14.

eventualities,* so that the serious apprehensions as to Prussia's selfish designs were more than justified.

Under these circumstances the proposed Conference was very acceptable, offering, if not an issue, at any rate a respite and a suspension of hostilities.

Space will not permit me to recapitulate the many contradictions of the diplomatic farce to which Earl Russell had convened the masters of the craft ; but the key-note of the proceedings is charmingly given by the noble Lord's *naïveté* when asking the Representatives of Austria and Prussia to be good enough to state to the Conference, firstly, the reasons why Danish territory had been occupied ; and secondly, the intention of their Governments.†

Count Apponyi's courteous but sarcastic reply, somewhat to the effect that the newspapers must have stated that the reasons were good and the intentions honourable, was decidedly marred by Count Bernstorff's blunt declaration that his Government could *not* accept the Protocol of 1852 as the basis of their deliberations, as it never had been "perfected."

This was clear and unambiguous language through which Herr von Bismarck's militant spirit was vibrating, and it nonplussed Earl Russell to such an extent, that he found nothing to say but "*il faudra donc chercher ailleurs les éléments d'une paix solide et durable.*"

* This message having been sent to H. R. H. by mistake on the wrong wire, fell, consequently, into the wrong hands.

† Sitting of May 28th, 1864.

Baron Brunnow, the true and chief inventor of "my" Protocol, as he called it, dwelt on equilibrium, treaties, and principles, and although admitting that Russia and the other signatories were bound by it, he remarked that the Confederation was not, and that an article of the treaty expressly reserved the rights and the obligations established by the Federal act (*Bundesacte*).*

Prince La Tour d'Auvergne spoke of international guarantees, universal suffrage, and peace at any price ; but, with the exception, of course, of Denmark, not one of the signatories of the Treaty of 1852, not one of the many fathers of this international *Cendrillon*, seemed inclined to take up the glove thrown by Prussia, and the only concession the Great Powers were able to obtain was, "that the Duke of Augustenburg should be thrown overboard at the same time as the Protocol of 1852 and the international stipulations concerning the integrity of the Danish Monarchy."

Nothing better answered Herr von Bismarck's plans, if we may judge by a private letter of his, of May 16th, 1864.†

"The actual state of things, however, is such, that it appears very necessary to let loose all the dogs willing to give tongue (forgive this sporting simile)

* Sitting of May 12th.

† Hesekiel, "Life of Bismarck," p. 263.

against Denmark at the Conference ; the general cry of the pack will effect a conviction on the part of alien Powers that the subjection of the Duchies to Denmark is an impossibility, and the latter will be obliged to consider projects which the Prussian Government cannot present to them. Among alien Powers in this last category I class the Holsteiners themselves, together with the Augustenburg, and all the eternally ignoble down to Königsau. The Duchies have hitherto played the part of the birthday child in the German family, and have accustomed themselves to think that we are willing to bring every sacrifice to the altar of their particular interests, and are willing to risk the existence of Prussia for every individual German in the north of Schleswig. The address will especially counteract this frenzy. I do not fear that it will have so strong an effect as to bring us into any difficulty. If Prussian ambition were to rise to such a height in the nation that the Government, instead of stimulating, would have to moderate the feeling, I should not at all regret such a condition. To clear up the situation I will conclude by saying that the Prussian annexation is not the chief and necessary end, but probably *the most agreeable result.*"

A touching confession, and it was probably to assist Providence in this gratifying task that Herr von Bismarck had officially announced Prussia's

withdrawal from the Protocol of 1852,* and that he had declared the Danish law of succession, for which he had broken so formidable a lance on December 1st, 1863, as not existing for the Duchies. But he did not yet bring forward Prussian claims; on the contrary, Count Bernstorff was instructed to pronounce in favour of the rights of the Prince of Augustenburg,† and the King of Prussia went so far as personally to tell the people on his arrival at the railway station at Schleswig, “that they would have their legitimate Prince;”‡ and whom else could His Majesty mean but the Duke Frederick, as Prussia was a party to the Federal declaration of May 28th, which recognised the rights of the Augustenburgs, as the late King Frederick William IV. had equally done by his letter of March 24th, 1848. Nay, when at the time the validity of the Duke’s claims was questioned, Herr von Bismarck gave it clearly to be understood “that the wishes of the population were more important than the question of right.” The sequel has shown that both were disregarded, and if Prussian diplomacy can congratulate itself on having done its part in the matter, the attitude of the Great Powers at the Conference did even more, for it provoked and prepared, so to say, “the agreeable result” to which

* Despatch of Herr von Bismarck of May 15th, 1864.

† Sitting of the Conference of May 12th, 1864.

‡ For which such legal authorities as Beseler, Hälschner, Wieding, Zachariaë, Zöpfl, Häusser, Waitz, etc., had pronounced.

§ “*Ihr werdet Euren rechtmässigen Fürsten erhalten.*”

Herr von Bismarck had alluded. In vain Baron Beust, the Representative of Germany at the Conference, made the most eloquent exertions to secure for the Diet its right of settling the matter of succession ; he found no support, and although both Austria and Prussia had declared at Frankfort in favour of the Augustenburg claims, his efforts at the Conference were baffled by the *non possumus* of his colleagues.*

Herr von Quaade and Herr Krieger were, if possible, still more unsuccessful with their protests, and Denmark was as deserted at the green table as she was in the field. The signatories of the Protocol were deaf to her entreaties, and she was coolly abandoned after having been incited to stand up for its provisions.

Lord John's memory became worse and worse ; it seemed as if he had never heard of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy ; he spoke of "the natural sympathies of the King of Denmark's German subjects for their Teutonic brethren," he shed a tear

* "Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that by the organ of the Germanic Confederation, by the population of the Duchies, and, finally, in their individual sovereign character (though as if to render the act more solemn conjointly) in the Conference of London, before the chief Powers of Europe there assembled, the Prince's claim to the sovereignty of the Duchies was acknowledged as the best founded by Austria and Prussia. It can hardly, then, be looked on as a pretension that the Prince considered himself legitimately seated on the Ducal throne ; and the surprise and indignation of his supporters, when Prussia began to question his right, and ended by ignoring it altogether, may well be conceived."—(Sir A. Malet, "Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation," p. 127.)

over the vicissitudes of human calculations, and another *pro forma* for the poor Danes ; but Herr von Bismarck's breech-loading arguments were too much for His Lordship's sensitive nerves, and to his everlasting shame, he, the British Premier, did not hesitate himself to recommend *the amputation of Holstein, Lauenburg and South Schleswig* ; the *where* in the latter case was his only thought, and in order not to endow Germany with too strong a position, he proposed the line of the Schlei and the Dannevirke, as best meeting the difficulty, but even on that point His Lordship was open to concessions, provided Prussia and Germany should " consent not to meddle with the *interior* affairs of Denmark *after* the cession of the Duchies,* and on condition that the Great Powers should re-guarantee the independence of what would be left of the Danish Monarchy." He could not have done less for Denmark or more for Prussia and Co., and posterity will not fail to remember the noble lord's unrivalled facility for tackling in rough weather, which, as a rule, is neither the disposition nor the habit of our country.

Deserted by all, Denmark could but yield, and on June 2nd, 1864, Herr von Quaade declared his royal master's readiness to submit to the English proposals. The cession of the Duchies was thus accepted in principle, and the future frontier alone had to be fixed.

Count Bernstorff first proposed the line of Apen-

* A not particularly hard condition, the moment Germany, or rather Prussia, had her own way.

rade, and then of Flensburg-Tondern, in preference to Lord Russell's line, Schlei-Dannevirke ; but, on June 18th, a new idea, that of consulting the populations, was started by the Prussian Representative. It was the application of our own example in the Ionian Islands, and of Lord John's aphorism, "That nations dissatisfied with their governments are entitled to a change if they like ;" and Count Bernstorff alluded to the recent precedents in Greece, at Naples, in Tuscany, Savoy, and at Nizza, etc., but *idem in idem non ut idem*, and neither Lord John nor Lord Clarendon felt any enthusiasm for a proposal which was not only certain to turn against Denmark, as of course all Germans would have voted for the "Fatherland," but which also would have presented serious difficulties with regard to the mixed districts.

Our Representatives, therefore, suggested leaving the settlement of the future frontier to the arbitration of a friendly Power, whilst Baron Reust insisted, in the name of the German nation, that as in the case of Savoy and Nice, so here the populations should be allowed to decide their own fate, concluding his speech by saying : "Denmark pretends that the larger part of Schleswig is Danish and wishes to remain so—*eh bien, qu'on le constate ;*" a view Prince La Tour d'Auvergne could not help supporting. But Denmark demurred on seeing that Russia was not inclined to encourage the Emperor Napoleon's "principle of nationalities," and that Austria and Prussia were far from agreeing, for

Count Apponyi distinctly opposed the idea of a universal suffrage, and contended that the Sovereign and the Provincial States alone ought to be consulted. The result was, therefore, a *non possumus* all round, and consequently a collapse of the diplomatic palaver, and a fresh outbreak of hostilities. It was the beginning of a new era, the accession to power of "Might is Right," and the renunciation of a voice in this European question by England and the other Great Powers in favour of Prussia, the armed candidate for the future international Mentorship.

Denmark was sacrificed, and her integrity, declared of "public utility" in 1852, became a nuisance. Earl Russell bottled up his proud challenges of past days, and Russia, as usual, gave way to the traditional family policy of her last rulers, and to the Czar's devotion to "Uncle William;" Baron Brunnow had to disavow his own child, "the Protocol," whereas Napoleon III. seemed delighted to pay us in Danish coin for not having seconded him in the Polish business, little thinking that it would prepare his own ruin, and that all Europe was simply working "for the King of Prussia."

An epidemic of general shortsightedness seemed to have come over all Cabinets; yet there never had been a more favourable moment for a great cosmopolitan policy and for a powerful peace coalition, and it must be deeply lamented that the efforts of Mr. Disraeli—for Lord Malmesbury's motion had a majority of nine in the Lords—were defeated in the

House of Commons by eighteen votes, and that his patriotic, one might say prophetic, warnings were disregarded. At that juncture a manly *veto* from Downing Street might not only have preserved peace, but also the European equilibrium jeopardised by the undisguised ambition of Prussia; and to-day, Lord Beaconsfield must look back with satisfaction on his chivalrous efforts to do what was right. Instead of that, Lord John's weakness encouraged the Berlin Cabinet in its very natural endeavours to profit by the exceptional opportunities which the indifference of the Great Powers was offering her.

But, putting aside the sentimental part of the question, and the natural sympathies for Denmark, our own interests and dignity were at stake. In 1852 we had proclaimed that Denmark's integrity was a European necessity, and we had no right to abandon our *protégé* after having prevented at the time a satisfactory settlement, when Russia advocated the *Personal-Union* of Denmark proper with the united and independent Duchies. A proposal in every way acceptable had Denmark not been indirectly urged to ask for more, and a scheme which in those days would have met with little opposition at Vienna, less at Berlin,* and most likely none at Frankfort, where His Majesty King Christian IX. would gladly have been welcomed by most of the Federal governments as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein,

* Even as late as 1863 Herr von Bismarck seemed inclined to favour this idea, according to Herr von Quade's despatch of Oct. 31st, 1863.

as this would have put a stop to the Augustenburg agitations, which were serving as a legitimate label to the dreaded revolutionary spirit of the people. Who then had prevented this simplest of all solutions? Who had stood in the way of this arrangement, which would have secured the Duchies to Denmark, and have satisfied the Diet and all concerned, of course with the exception of the unfortunate Duke of Augustenburg? Who then, we may well ask, had been holding Denmark back from accepting an honourable compromise so often within her reach; who had been indirectly urging her to reject all offers and to insist upon more than she could hope for; who, in short, had been misleading Denmark by filling her with the hope of our assistance, or at least of our moral support against an eventual Federal execution?*

* The following extracts from a letter of a Danish M.P. to the editor of the *Morning Post*, July 4th, 1878, will give an idea of what is thought of Lord Russell in Denmark.

"It is as a foreigner that I have followed Lord Russell's career as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and as a Dane I am still smarting under a deep sense of the unjustifiable wrong done to my country under his auspices. . . . In an incredibly short time he succeeded in unfastening all the bonds then sustaining the balance of power in Europe, and in creating a general chaos, out of which, after the respect for treaties and positive international law had been sapped and honeycombed, all the misfortunes and bloody struggles under which Europe has since suffered have arisen. . . . It was easy enough to see, even then, that the real question pending between Denmark and the German Confederation, the strings of which were pulled by Prussia, was not at all constitutional but a national one. . . . It was told often enough, it was cried loudly enough day after day, that the real aim of Prussia was the dismemberment of Denmark, and the conquest of Holstein with the harbour of Kiel. . . . Lord Russell was deaf and blind to all such considera-

If alive,* Earl Russell would best have been in a position to answer these questions, as he is alone responsible for our playing fast and loose with principles, convictions, promises, and pledges; for we must not forget that Lord Palmerston's great age had not prevented him from urging His Majesty the late King of Hanover to impress upon the German Sovereigns assembled at Frankfort, in August, 1863, the necessity of being very careful, *as England would feel bound to help the Danes in*

tions; he insisted upon regarding the struggle as essentially one of a constitutional character, and as that was his particular line, he set at work to invent solutions. . . . One thing is evident from the published protocols of the Congress (1864), and that is that Lord Russell, on the part of England, made proposal after proposal, more and more deviating from the *status quo ante* and the Treaty of 1852, and that when the Danish plenipotentiaries, hardly pressed by their country's helpless state and deserted by all friends, did accept such a British proposal, it was only to see it dropped the next day by its own author, and replaced by a new one, to which the Representative of England did not stick any more than to all the preceding expedients. . . . It must be easy to see how, since the time of Lord Russell's conducting the Foreign Office, England has gone down an incline, on which only now, and with an immense effort, a stand has been made. . . . During the administration of Lord Russell England did not keep clear of the quarrels; she meddled and muddled with them long enough to stir up a general movement, and to disturb the respect for treaties and positive law, but when the moment came for settling them she kept aloof. . . . It was the Russell administration that then first gave to the world the dangerous example of disrespect to a clear and recent treaty, and for this sin, of which Denmark became the victim, England and the world have since had to atone. To this precedent alone can it be attributed that Prussia has for twelve years shown her utter disrespect for the Prague treaty, on which her own power rests."

* This sketch was written before Lord Russell's demise.

case of a conflict with the German army of execution.*

Moreover, he proposed to rescue our national dignity, at the last moment, by similar language in the speech from the Throne on January 1st, 1864, declaring the intention of standing by Denmark, come what may, but he had to give way to his colleagues; and his letter of August 28th, 1864, to His Majesty King Leopold, shows how strongly he felt on the subject :

“SIRE,

“I have many apologies to make to your Majesty for not having sooner thanked you for your letter of the 15th June. We were at that time in the midst of an engrossing session of Parliament, and the unequal contest between Denmark and Germany was still undecided, though with little hope that right could prevail over might. The Danish Government, both under the late and under the present King, undoubtedly committed many mistakes, both of commission and omission, and they showed throughout these affairs, from beginning to end, that inaptitude to deal with great concerns which might perhaps have been expected from a nation shut up in a remote corner of Europe, and not mixed up or practised with the general politics of the world. It was, however, an unworthy abuse of power by Austria and Prussia to take ad-

* A verbal message transmitted to His Majesty by an exalted personage, at Lord Palmerston's special request.

vantage of their superior enlightenment and strength to crush an antagonist utterly incapable of successful resistance ; and the events of this Danish war do not form a page in German history which any honourable or generous German hereafter will look back upon without a blush. I wish that France and Russia had consented to join with us in giving a different direction to those affairs ; and I am convinced that words from three such Powers would have been sufficient without a recourse to blows. One consequence is clear and certain, namely, that if our good friend and neighbour at Paris were to take it into his head to deprive Prussia of her Rhenish provinces, not a finger in England would be stirred, nor a voice raised, nor a man nor a shilling voted to resist such retribution upon the Prussian Monarch ; and when France and Italy shall be prepared to deliver Venetia from the Austrian yoke, the joy which the success of such an undertaking will be hailed throughout England will be doubled by the recollection of Holstein, Lauenburg, Schleswig, and Jutland.

“ I have the honour to be, Sire,

“ Your Majesty’s most obedient, humble servant,

“ PALMERSTON.”*

Was it a feeling of isolation, or was it a doubt of the sincerity of the Emperor of the French ? Lord John replaced Lord Palmerston’s policy of action,

* E. Ashley’s “ Life of Viscount Palmerston,” vol. ii. pp. 255, 256.

notwithstanding Denmark's justifiable entreaties for active assistance,* by a diplomatic demonstration ; but Lord Clarendon's mission to Paris in September, 1864, only added to Denmark's empty hopes, and induced Herr von Bismarck to hasten the solution of the crisis.

The Treaty of Vienna of October 30th, 1864, stripped Denmark, or rather King Christian IX., of the three Duchies—Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg ; but their appropriation by Austria and Prussia, in their capacity of Great Powers, without any regard for the Confederation, was equal to the death-warrant of the *Bund*, and thus became indirectly the nullification of Austria's authority in Germany.

The Danish campaign had been the dress-rehearsal for the great military *epopœia* of the Prussian conqueror ; the reorganisation of the army—the personal work of King William—had been tested ; and convinced of the efficiency “of the instrument,” as His Majesty called it, Herr von Bismarck thought the moment propitious for proving the impotence of both Austria and the venerable Confederation.

By the Convention of Gastein† sovereign masters of Schleswig, the first care of the Prussians had been to break up the Diet at Frankfort, and to inform the august Assembly that Schleswig had

* Note of M. Torben Bille, the Danish Minister at our Court, to Earl Russell, dated February 11th, 1864.

† Convention of Gastein of August 15th, 1865.

never been German, and that her twin-relationship to Holstein was mere historical rubbish.

All the arguments Denmark had in past years ventured to bring forward were now used by the Prussian King-Duke of Schleswig; but behind such arguments stood an army, and Herr von Bismarck's threat to sever "Prussia's connection with the Confederation, in case the *Bundestag* should dare to overstep its prerogatives, as laid down or interpreted by him, or in case Germany should assert its rights respecting Schleswig, or even with regard to Holstein and Lauenburg, other than would suit the policy of the Berlin Cabinet, was a *coup de Jarnac* to the tottering edifice at Frankfort, and was heralding the dissolution and inaugurating the second act of the new era.

"The first difference between the two Governments declared itself with respect to the right of succession to the Ducal sovereignty of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein being vested in the hereditary Prince of Augustenburg, as recognised by the joint declaration of Austria and Prussia in the London Conference. . . . While, then, the Imperial Government faithfully adhered to that declaration, it was unhesitatingly set aside by M. de Bismarck, in pursuance of his secret resolve to annex the Elbe Duchies . . . but so resolved was the Prussian Premier, that when in the sitting of the Diet of December 5th, 1864, a proposition was made to regulate the succession by the sole authority of the Diet, His Excellency made this declaration to the

Courts of Saxony and Munich, dated September 13th: "That if this proposition was adopted by the Diet, the political independence of Prussia would be imperilled, and Prussia would thereby find herself compelled to make use of her freedom of action in defence of her rights, in consequence of the violation of treaties by an illegally adopted decision."*

The Emperor Francis Joseph imagined he was complying with right and honour, traditional in the House of Hapsburg, by taking the part of the Diet, and by transferring Holstein to Federal rule.

But in identifying at that moment Austria's interests with those of the distracted *Bund*, His Majesty offered Prussia a pretext for provoking a violent solution; and it is incredible how they could imagine at the *Ballplatz* that the Prussians would be satisfied with Schleswig alone, when they made no secret at Berlin of their views on Holstein;† when they tried so hard to unearth "the hereditary rights and claims of the House of Brandenburg" to the

* Sir Alexander Malet, "Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation by Prussia in 1866," p. 19.

† Already when occupied by the Federal troops, Holstein had been the theatre of petty Prussian intrigues; thus when the Diet had ordered certain payments for the maintenance of the army of execution, out of the accumulated revenues of Holstein, Prussia, as if afraid that there would not remain enough for her in the Ducal exchequer, moved heaven and earth to prevent the Holstein officials from complying with the constitutional request of the *Bundestag*; and the Prussian troops were even instructed by telegraph to waylay and to stop the train which was conveying the modest sum of about £60,000 from Rendsburg to the Federal headquarters.

disputed duchies,* as if anxious to give their intentions a covering of legality; and when the possible annexation was openly discussed by the King's own surroundings; thus the well-known *Hofrath* Louis Schneider told the King of Hanover at the time, that Prussia *must* have Holstein, wrong as it might be.† But not to leave a shadow of a doubt in Austrian minds, Herr von Bismarck entered into direct negotiations on the subject with Count Rechberg's successor, managing with his usual astuteness to turn the tables in his favour, and I cannot give a better account of the transaction than by quoting verbatim from "Scrutator":‡ "It may be a weakness of mine, but I cannot help making comparisons between some remarkable coincidences in Count Bismarck's political career. I remember a certain secret despatch which Count Bismarck succeeded in worming out of Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Minister at the end of 1864, whilst the quarrel between the two German Powers was brewing.

* *Unrecht ist es, aber haben müssen wir es doch.* Herr von Bismarck had commissioned the legal advisers of the Crown to examine the various hereditary claims to the Duchies, amongst which was prominent that of Prussia, and endless pamphlets were advocating the rights of Brandenburg, in preference to all others, based upon the fact that the Elector Joachim I. married the daughter of John I. of Denmark, who, as the Prussian Court historians argued, ought not to have been succeeded by his brother Frederick I. of Denmark, but by his grandsons, Joachim II. of Brandenburg, and Hans of Küstrin, at any rate in the Segeberg part of the Duchies, which included Rendsburg, Flensburg, Apenrade, Alsen, and Fernahrn. (*Das Preussische Erbland Schleswig-Holstein.* Berlin, 1865. *Suum cuique.*)

† "*Unrecht ist es, aber haben müssen wir Holstein doch*" (*Hofrath* Louis Schneider's own words).

‡ "Who is Responsible for the War?" by "Scrutator," pp. 89—91.

The Austrian Minister had protested against the possession of the Elbe Duchies by Prussia. But the Prussian statesman is always ready on such occasions with a frank offer to share the spoil. Austria, unfortunately, was not above the temptation of rising to the bait. In a confidential despatch of December 21, 1864, Count Mensdorff placed himself at the mercy of his adversary by these two unguarded sentences :

“ ‘ Austria would only assent to the incorporation of the Duchies with Prussia upon an equivalent augmentation of her own German territory being guaranteed to her. Austrian blood had not been shed for the sake of disturbing the balance of power between the two great German States by a one-sided aggrandisement.’

“ The game was now in Prince Bismarck’s hands. The Austrian despatch found its way, no one could tell how, into the *Vienna Presse*, and was thence transmitted all over Germany. The suspicions of the minor States were immediately roused, and some of them demanded from Count Mensdorff a declaration as to the portion of German territory Austria aimed at annexing. The result was that Austria could no longer command the united support of her usual allies in the Confederation. They distrusted her, and began acting independently. This was precisely what Count Bismarck wanted. He first divided his enemies, and then beat them easily in detail. And this he accomplished by the surreptitious publication of a confidential despatch.”

A wonderful specimen of diplomatic sleight of hand, an admirable move on the German chess-board, the old *divide et impera* successfully used by Herr von Bismarck. Austria found itself between two stools, and the *Bund* fared no better; the demands of Prussia became more and more imperative, and although she had been rigorously pleading the precedence of German rights, as long as the claims of Denmark were in question, she was of a very different opinion when standing herself in King Christian's shoes. "Might is right," and as King William did not lack the former, he took the latter as his due, a very simple question of military arithmetic.*

We know the sequel; how Austria was forced to draw the sword, and how the unfortunate *Bund* was dragged into the strife, and one may well say of it,

"More in his cause's truth he trusted than in might."

But as this page of modern history will find a place elsewhere,† it would be a tedious repetition of a sad story.

The Treaty of Prague was the funeral monument erected by the Prussian Premier to the Schleswig-Holstein question, and proved the truth of his words

* Lord Molesworth says, in his "Account of Denmark as it was in 1692" (p. 128): "His (the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp's) territories are intermixed both in Schleswig and Holstein with the King's (the King of Denmark), but much to his disquiet and inconvenience; for ambition knows no bounds, especially when joined with power sufficient to oppress a weak opponent." We have only to substitute Prussia for Denmark, and Denmark for Holstein-Gottorp, and what Lord Molesworth wrote in 1700 will apply to the case before us.

† See Sketch VI.

to General Türr, "that Austria had always been working for Prussia."*

The Article V., which transferred the rights obtained by the Emperor of Austria in the Treaty of Vienna to King William, and which handed the Duchies over to Prussian rule, contained however the clause "that North Schleswig should be retroceded to Denmark, if expressing the wish by a free and popular vote."

To understand this apparent concession, after Count Bismarck's previous declarations, it will be necessary to return once more to the period immediately preceding the Treaty of Vienna, and to remember the appeal already made at that time by North Schleswig to the Emperor Napoleon, when Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys promised the support of his master at the first opportunity France should find for recommending the wishes of the Schleswigers to the consideration of the Great Powers, adding that the moment had not yet come for doing so.

Herr von Bismarck, when sounded upon his intentions, declared in his blunt way, which one cannot help admiring, "that Denmark had lost her chance by not accepting in time the line Flensburg-Tondern, and that now it was too late, *as King William had*

* What a contrast between the end and the beginning, when "a guarantee given by Prussia of the integrity of the possessions of Austria in the event of war arising from her co-operation with Prussia, was one of the inducements which led Count Rechberg to engage his country in this overweening exercise of power." (Sir A. Malet, "Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation," p. 14.)

pronounced in favour of the Duke of Augustenburg, His Majesty believing in the Duke's right to Schleswig, and being of opinion that either all Schleswig or not a stone of it could be claimed by the lawful sovereign of the Duchies." The Prussian Premier added, however, "That if his own wishes were to be consulted, he would much rather see Prussia incorporating the Duchies, *minus* North Schleswig, than letting the Duke of Augustenburg have them in their entirety, certain that neither Great Britain, France, nor Russia would oppose the annexation to Prussia, whilst Austria would hardly go to war for it. But," concluded the Prussian Premier, "the King fancies that another (the Duke of Augustenburg) has a right to the Duchies, and of course *I* cannot be more royalist than the King, although I should at any time, in case of an ultimate incorporation of the Duchies with Prussia, be disposed to let Denmark have North Schleswig in order to avoid unnecessary collisions."*

However, *l'appétit vient en mangeant*; and when, shortly after the cession of the three Duchies to Austria and Prussia, a Danish patriot obtained an interview with the Prussian Premier,† Herr von Bismarck seemed to regard the annexation of the Duchies to Prussia more hopefully, having apparently succeeded in raising some doubts in King William's mind as to the genuineness of the Duke of Augustenburg's title; he declared "that he hoped

* J. Hansen: "A travers la Diplomatie," pp. 15—19.

† Ibid. pp. 23—25.

never to see *the Pretender* on the throne ;” and he gave it to be understood that Prussia would *necessarily* require a compensation, a *territorial compensation*, in the south or elsewhere, if consenting to retrocede the Danish-speaking part of North Schleswig, should the Duchies be incorporated with her dominions.

The Convention of Gastein was the first step towards the realisation of Herr von Bismarck’s plans ; it disregarded the so-called Pretender and the Duchies, whose rights and claims had been the pretext of Germany’s interference, nay, of the whole war. It disregarded the German Confederation, which had been pleading, sword in hand, for the indissolubility of the Duchies ; it disregarded the Great Powers, who had proclaimed the integrity of Denmark ; it disregarded the principle of nationalities, which was not respected ; it disregarded the populations, who were not consulted ; it disregarded the advice, the aspirations, and the wishes of all concerned, and substituting brutal violence for traditions and treaties, it simply proved that the war against Denmark had been a war of *conquest*. In other words, the Treaty of Gastein stripped His Majesty the King of Denmark, the Diet, and the Duke of Augustenburg, by the same stroke of the pen, of their respective rights or claims, and the arbitrary division of the spoil between Austria and Prussia inaugurated Herr von Bismarck’s iron motto, “*Might is right.*”

But Gastein was to be even more, it was to be the *agent provocateur* of the future rupture between the two accomplices ; whilst the protest of the Diet was nothing but an impotent flickering up *in extremis* ; and what else could it be, considering that the Great Powers seemed determined to act the part of international mutes ?* The principle of non-intervention seemed the only inviolable one, and the ex-patrons of the Protocol had not even the decency to express their displeasure at the humiliating results (for Europe) of the Treaty of Gastein. The Emperor Napoleon alone, or rather Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, ventured a few mild remarks in his circular despatch of August 29th, 1865 ; however, carefully summing up with a request to the French Representatives abroad not to see in this epistle "*l'intention de vous inviter à adresser des observations à ce sujet.*" It was as if France had been afraid of expressing an opinion, whilst England and Russia seemed to have none.

* "Not only, then, had the redress of German wrongs in Holstein been effected, in spite of the gallant but ineffectual struggle of over-matched Denmark, but pretexts had been found for further spoliation, and for wresting from her Schleswig and Lauenburg. Jutland also had been invaded. These acts were accomplished by high-handed power, and acquiesced in by the rest of Europe with an apathy and indifference not to be explained in the eyes of statesmen, even by the temporary mistrust existing between England and France on account of our rejection of the European Congress ; excusable, perhaps, on the part of Russia by the burthen of gratitude imposed upon her by all but active assistance which Prussia had recently given her in suppressing the Polish insurrection, but violations of principles regretted by true patriots of every colour." (Sir A. Malet, "Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation," p. 16.)

Lord Palmerston, unfortunately, had one foot in the grave, and, unable to do as he liked, he appears to have endeavoured to make the best of a bad job, if we look at the following letter to Earl Russell, dated September 13th, 1865.

“ MY DEAR RUSSELL,

“ It was dishonest and unjust to deprive Denmark of Schleswig and Holstein. It is another question how those two Duchies, when separated from Denmark, can be disposed of best for the interests of Europe. I should say that, with that view, it is better that they should go to increase the power of Prussia than that they should form another little State to be added to the cluster of bodies politic which encumber Germany, and render it of less force than it ought to be in the general balance of power in the world. Prussia is too weak as she now is ever to be honest or independent in her action ; and with a view to the future, it is desirable that Germany, in the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those two ambitious and aggressive Powers, France and Russia, that press upon her west and east.

“ Germany ought to be strong in order to resist Russian aggression, and a strong Prussia is essential to German strength. Therefore, though I heartily condemn the whole of the proceedings of Austria and Prussia about the Duchies, I own that I should rather see them incorporated with Prussia

than converted into an additional asteroid in the system of Europe.”*

But if Lord Palmerston, wearied and disgusted at having been ousted, was under misapprehensions as to the consequences, Lord Russell, forgetful of all his former solemn declarations, saw nothing in the annexation of the Duchies but a political blue pill, so that Herr von Bismarck's remark cannot surprise us, “that we had been erased from all his political calculations since the cession of the Ionian Isles; as, according to him, a Power that ceases to take, and begins to give up, is an exhausted Power.”† A hard criticism, which makes one's blood boil with shame, and which adds to the pride and satisfaction we feel at the manly determination of our present Government to reclaim our rightful place in the European *arcopagus*. But at the time there was no one to check Prussian ambition. Lord Palmerston was dead, Napoleon III. was dreaming, and Russia, as Prince Gortschakoff called it, only “brooding,” so that the moment for a violent solution seemed propitious to the statesmen in Berlin.

Austria's convocation of the Provincial Diet of Holstein, and her honest but imprudent step of re-transferring the question of the Duchy once more to the *Bundestag*, was the beginning of the end. Her hesitation to purchase Italy's neutrality by a

* E. Ashley, “Life of Viscount Palmerston,” vol. ii. pp. 270, 271.

† It is to be hoped that the Treaty of June 4th and the occupation of Cyprus will have raised us “a wee bit” in H. S. H.'s opinion.

timely cession of Venetia ere General Govone's mission to Berlin had made this step impossible, was dictated by a sort of false shame and pride, and contributed necessarily to strengthen the intrigues of the Prussian Cabinet, whilst the double-faced policy of the Emperor Napoleon, whom Herr von Bismarck or Prince Napoleon (I do not remember which) styled afterwards "the embodiment of misunderstood incapacity," diminished the faint hopes of a peaceful ending.

The instrument, as I mentioned before, was perfect ; it was admirably tuned, and the dance could begin, His Prussian Majesty opening the ball in person, sure of the ultimate triumph of his arms.*

Sadowa endorsed the royal expectations. Austria was annihilated, and the Treaty of Prague, which sealed the fate of the Duchies as Prussian provinces, became also the death-warrant of the *Bund*. Herr von Bismarck's words to Baron Schleinitz, when Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1859, that Prussia would have to extirpate "*ferro et igne* this particularistic hothouse," as he was pleased to call the German Confederation, had been practically executed by himself, and he was now sole master of the situation, with nothing to mar his triumph, save perhaps the clause in the Treaty of Prague relating to North Schleswig, which, in a weak moment, as he described it in Parliament, he had conceded to the

* As this episode will be treated in detail in a further Sketch, the author has thought best only to indicate the results at this place.

Emperor of the French, who, apparently faithful to his principle of nationalities, and not forgetful of his promises to the Schleswig deputation, had insisted upon this poor *fiche de consolation* for Denmark.

Thanks to His Majesty, the Article III. of the preliminary Treaty of Nicolsburg contained the following clause: "*S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche transfère à S. M. le Roi de Prusse tous les droits que la paix de Vienne du 30 Octobre, 1864, lui avait reconnus sur les Duchés de Schleswig et de Holstein, avec cette réserve que les districts du Nord de Schleswig seront de nouveau réunis au Danemark s'ils en expriment le désir par un vote librement émis.*"

Under the circumstances Denmark could not wish more ; yet there already appeared a cloud when the Treaty of Prague was to ratify the provisions of the preliminaries of Nicolsburg, and it was seriously contemplated to eliminate the clause respecting North Schleswig, as Count Bismarck contested "*l'opportunité*" of its insertion, so that it required once more the intervention of Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys to obtain this concession from the Prussian Premier. Article V. of the Treaty of Prague, containing the identical provisions as Article III. of the Treaty of Nicolsburg, thus owed its existence to French interference ; but it was as good as still-born, for how could Denmark exact its execution when there was no term fixed for the expression of the popular vote ? North Schleswig remained, therefore, simply at the mercy of Prussia, and it was not

likely that the King or his Minister would have more regard for Denmark than they had shown for the *Bund*, and for Germany at large, or that they would go out of their way to create an undesirable precedent by according to the inhabitants of North Schleswig the right of deciding their own fate, as naturally the populations of Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, etc., might, and would then have invoked a similar privilege.

That Article V. was from the first doomed to remain a dead letter was moreover evident from the debates in the Prussian Second Chamber, which expressed the hope that His Majesty would reconsider its provisions, whilst Count Bismarck apologised, in a remarkable speech,* for having consented to this *objectionable* clause under the momentary pressure of a *quasi ultimatum* of the Emperor Napoleon, adding, that happily the "vague form of its wording left him an ample latitude in the matter."

How the great Prussian statesman intended to circumscribe the difficulty without formally tearing up Article V. was not long to remain a mystery, for already, in April, 1867, he had instructed the Prussian Envoy at Copenhagen† to inform the Danish Government, "that Prussia, having in no way renounced her sovereign rights on all German inhabitants of Schleswig, he (Count Bismarck) would be glad to know what "guarantees" Denmark could

* December 20th, 1867.

† *Herrn von Heydebrandt von der Lasa.*

offer for avoiding a collision of sovereign prerogatives in the districts eventually to be retroceded."

Imposing thus upon Denmark an impossible and insoluble task, Count Bismarck surrounded Article V. with new difficulties, and the answer of Count Frijs, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, "that the *Danish Constitution* ought to be a sufficient guarantee for the German inhabitants of North Schleswig," was simply put *ad acta*; and when the Marquis de Moustier, the successor of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, instructed the French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to support the Danish reclamations, Herr von Thiele declared to Monsieur Lefèvre de Béhaine that Count Bismarck would *not* tolerate any foreign interference in this matter; and the Prussian Press received instructions to protest as violently as possible against this French "*outré-cuidance*."

As to the populations of North Schleswig, Count Bismarck openly contested their right to demand the execution of Article V., left, so he alleged, entirely to the good pleasure of Prussia,* whose duty it was to protect "the German minority," before thinking of gratifying the hopes of the Danish inhabitants.

Count Bismarck, the high priest of national

* Admitting, however, that, strictly, Austria might have a right to remind Prussia of this Article, whilst the Prussian Press went so far as to say that, having been inserted at the request of the Emperor Napoleon III., the fall of the Empire had necessarily the consequence of nullifying these provisions.

magnetism, and of Mr. Carlyle's deified theory of the natural gravitating of the weak towards the strong, had found a new formula for extending his all-absorbing sway, by making himself the champion of a minority—and remembering, moreover his axiom, "That a Power which ceases to take, and begins to give up, is an exhausted Power," he did not wish to become untrue to himself and to libel his own creation by a sentimental weakness for the Danish claims.

However, the negotiations with Denmark were allowed to linger on, but such were the exorbitant demands formulated by Herr Lothar Bucher, in his master's name, that Herr von Quaade, who cannot well be suspected of exaggerated pessimism, seemed at last to doubt the possibilities of coming to terms with the terrible Chancellor, for whose *loyalty** to the Danish cause he had been vouching in days past.

Sedan was the state funeral of Article V. ; France alone had raised her voice in favour of Denmark, and France was no more, or, at any rate, crushed for a time. Russia seemed squared by vague promises of a passive attitude of Prussia-Germany during the next outbreak in the East ; and we—I mean England—were worshipping with Mr. Carlyle at the shrine of success, without daring to turn against the Prussian Chancellor his own maxim, "the protection of the rights of minorities." Erased from Prince Bismarck's political calculations,

* Despatch of Herr von Quaade of October 31st, 1863.

we have been filling for a long time, with dignified composure, the peaceful office of international mourner, and there is little doubt that our too platonic sympathies with the misfortunes of Denmark and similar acts will by-and-by entail upon us enormous sacrifices for reasserting our legitimate influence in all international matters. Sir Alexander Malet has said, very rightly, that "History will have to decide how far the character of England was upheld by the statesmen who governed the country at the time, and whether moral influence is to be entirely disregarded in public policy. It is not to be doubted that her utter desertion of Denmark lowered her national reputation, and left a stigma of egotism on the nation. Posterity will judge the capacity of those who left it to future generations to repair a neglect of so grave a nature."*

Luckily for us, the present generation can boast of a statesman equal to the occasion, and there is no doubt that Lord Beaconsfield's attitude at the Berlin Conference has reconquered for us the lost *prestige* of our name and voice, and the Treaty of June 4th will tell the world *what* we intend to defend against all comers. But as our past indifference has contributed to rear military agglomerations in Germany and elsewhere, thus obliging the world to stand *Gewehr bei Fuss*, we shall of course have to pay the penalty ; and it will require endless sacrifices of

* Sir Alexander Malet, "Overthrow of the Germanic Confederation," p. 27.

the—I beg Prince Bismarck's pardon—of the not “exhausted,” as he termed it, but the *inexhaustible* power of Great Britain, to put down with a strong hand the military dictatorships which are such a constant threat to the peace and the prosperity of the world, to the welfare and the liberties of the people. But if, according to one of Lord Beaconsfield's last sayings, “delay has up to now proved golden,” it will be as well for all concerned to remember that our Premier wrote in days past the flaming words, “Success is the child of Audacity;” and, not lacking the latter, England can rest assured that Lord Beaconsfield will rear Audacity's baby with the milk of true patriotism, and that, if forced into action, he will startle the world by the boldness of his blows.

As to poor Denmark, there is every chance that she will have to look at Article V. as the fox did at the grapes, by pronouncing them sour. I do not see any hope for the present, unless in the eventuality of some future war with Russia, Prussia should, as lately hinted by her official Press, oppose our entering the Baltic and thus give us an opportunity for re-opening the Danish question; as the same interest which prompts us not to allow the entrance of the Black Sea to fall into the hands of a Great Power, must induce us to maintain the keys of the Baltic in those of a second-rate one.

Denmark herself can do nothing unless she should be tempted to purchase North Schleswig with her own independence, by joining the German Empire,

thus giving herself body and soul to the insatiable wooer at Berlin, in order to recover her little finger. Already the German, or rather the Prussian school-masters, are teaching the Prussian youth, with the aid of "patriotic" maps, "that Denmark and Holland are German *appendices*;" and even Prince Bismarck's favourite organ, the *Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, asserted this same preposterous theory not long ago.

The pedigree of this German claim on independent neighbouring states* is a gem of ingenuity: "Prussia annexes the Danish Duchy of Schleswig, but Schleswig having previously been linked to the also annexed German Duchy of Holstein, becomes thus by proxy German, whilst the Danish elements in North Schleswig, attracting by a reversed process of gravitation the ex-cradle of Schleswig towards the amputated and Prussified minority, Denmark becomes in consequence an appendix of Germany;" *quod erat demonstrandum*;† and last-year (January, 1877) serious hopes were expressed in the Prussian capital that the Danish Liberals (*die Linke*) could be made to agree to some such proposal; and if not, there was another even more elaborate programme in

* The right of Germany to Holland, derived by similar conclusions, on account of Luxemburg, has likewise repeatedly been aired by the Berlin Press.

† It will be interesting to notice that Leibniz suggested some such "union" of Denmark and North Germany, in a pro-memoria of the year 1671 (*Denkschrift für Dänemark zum Zwecke eines Norddeutschen Bundes mit Einschluss Dänemarks*: O. Klopp, *Die Werke von Leibniz*, vol. i. pp. 319 et seq.).

store, a sort of military and commercial union* of Prussia-Germany with the three Scandinavian kingdoms, and in that case—so the officious Berlin Press was kind enough to hint—North Schleswig would be restored to Denmark “without any further guarantee.” His Majesty King Oscar of Sweden† and H. I. and R. H. the Crown Prince of Prussia, so rumour said, were the patrons of the latter scheme, whilst Prince Bismarck seemed personally little disposed to do anything for the nonce, as it would simply have been alienating both Great Britain and Russia without an adequate advantage. *Ché va piano va sano*, and the Chancellor is not the man to make a false move if he can help it. Time, the most successful of schemers, is sure to come to his aid, and we can be certain that he will not part with North Schleswig without a *quid pro quo*.

For the moment the question is in abeyance, although the results of the recent elections have once more shown the irreconcilable disposition of the Danish population, and their determination not to accept their present fate as a final solution; a further proof of which will be found in the following protest of the members of the Landtag for North Schleswig and Alsen, when declining on August 4th of this year to join in an address to the German

* *Zoll Union*.

† During a recent stay at Cologne, H. M., so the writer has been assured on good authority, expressed his desire for some such solution, pleading warmly the advantages of a *rapprochement* of the Scandinavian kingdoms and Prussia-Germany.

Emperor, on occasion of the two attempts on his life :

“ As far as the address expresses the fullest condemnation of the criminal attempts against His Majesty the Emperor, we could without hesitation add our names to it. We are deeply penetrated by horror of such misdeeds, and, in grateful consideration of the promise given by treaty to the Danish Schleswigers of disposing by their own vote of their future allegiance, we might even feel inclined to join the Assembly in expressing respectful veneration for the aged Monarch, and offering thanks for the wonderful escape of His Imperial and Royal Majesty. But we must record our strong protest against all the rest of the address, especially against the paragraph about the liberation from foreign dominion and against the wish for a lasting connection with Germany. In this and other similar points the address is no correct expression of the wishes and sympathies of the population of the entire province. The inhabitants of the northern districts of Schleswig are not of German nationality, and do not regard Germany as their country. They are Danes, and deprecate any lasting connection with Germany, availing themselves of the clause of the Prague Treaty, according to which they are, if they so express their wish by a free vote, to be re-united to Denmark. In what direction these wishes go there are signs enough to indicate, and the very last days have once more, by the result of the elections, clearly shown which way the sympathies are running. The

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events of 1864, alluded to in the address, far from delivering the Danish Schleswigers, have brought them under a foreign dominion, which they fervently long to see exchanged for the return to Danish rule promised them by the Prague Treaty. So we cannot approach the Emperor's throne with the same assertions of devout love and faithful allegiance as our German colleagues without making ourselves guilty of hypocrisy. But that we neither will nor can do. We dare not sin against honest truth, and, therefore, we feel compelled to vote against the address."*

Animated by such sentiments, there is every reason to believe that they will not forget their origin nor their nationality, for, "Though a nation

* The *Times* of August 13th accompanied the above by the following reflections: "The late elections in Schleswig to the German Reichstag have entirely confirmed the experience of former years. By skilful management and arbitrary arrangement of the electoral districts, the Prussian authorities have prevented the Danish population from having more than one representative in the German Parliament; but if the voting in the different towns and parishes is compared, the same sharp and well-defined line of division between German and Danish is drawn as immediately after the annexation of 1864. In the towns the immigrant Prussian *employés* and their hangers-on are able to show a feeble German majority, but in the country districts the Danes carry everything before them. In spite of the numerous persecutions and police measures put in force against the inhabitants of Danish sympathies, and driving over the frontier a large part of the young manly population, the Danish element still shows, up to a line passing just south of Flensburg on the Baltic to Tonder on the North Sea, a majority of between 80 and 90 per cent., and the number of German votes has actually declined since 1867. But the struggle is hard for the Danish population, and they raise their voice claiming that the obligations undertaken by Prussia by the 5th Article of the Treaty of Prague, concluded in 1866, be not put off any longer, but at once carried into execution."

may be bought and sold, deceived or betrayed, oppressed or beggared, and in every other sense undone, *all* is not lost as long as a sense of national honour survives the general ruin ;”* and there is no doubt that circumstances will arise which will allow a reopening of this vexed question, if the Danes and Schleswigers continue to deserve the sympathies of Europe by their quiet, moderate, and dignified attitude. In fact there have been quite recently some rumours to this effect, coupled with a contemplated matrimonial alliance ; but those who have followed Article V. from its birth to its present syncope, will admit that nothing is less probable than that the Empress Eugénie should abandon the prudent reserve and the political tact which characterise her dignified retirement, by taking upon herself the ungrateful part of mediator in a question where Napoleon III. had not been able to succeed at the very pinnacle of power. We have only to remember the answer Herr von Thiele gave in 1867, in the Chancellor’s name, to the overtures of the Tuileries, to rest assured that all Prince Bismarck’s chivalrous feelings for a lady and an Empress would not induce him to listen to any proposals coming from that quarter ; neither Germany nor France would, for the present, submit to an interference of the Imperial party in international and other matters, and we may be confident that the Empress would be the last to revive a

* From a letter of Sir Philip Francis to Earl Grey in 1812.

question distasteful to Prince Bismarck, and unlikely to further the chances of the Prince Imperial.

It is much more probable that the Prussian Chancellor will one of these days surprise the world with a spontaneous solution of his own, if only he is unceasingly reminded of this stain on the conscience of Europe.

There is no doubt that the sense of equity and fairness, so prevalent in our country, would hail with satisfaction even so poor a reparation as the retrocession of North Schleswig to Denmark. That the sympathies of our Premier have of old been with Denmark we all know; but Contarini Fleming wrote "Time," and the author of Tancred, "Opportunity is more powerful even than conquerors and prophets." We may be sure that Lord Beaconsfield will not "lose an occasion" when it presents itself.

Besides it would be impossible for England to do less for the Schleswigers than for Bulgarians, Servians, Roumanians, and *tutti quanti*, after having deserted gallant little Denmark in her unequal struggles for a Protocol that Europe had forced upon her. We have only to invoke the same spirit and the same principles respecting national rights which Prussia claimed in 1860 for the German Duchies,* only to remember Lord Palmerston's words, "That the integrity and independence of the State which commands the Baltic are objects of interest to England,"† not to forget that in this case British

* See page 37.

† See Sketch I., page 56.

interests go hand in hand with Danish claims ; and Prince Bismarck will understand "that we are bound in honour" not to limit to the East the spirited intervention inaugurated by Lord Beaconsfield.

That General von Bülow, who for the last twelve years has so ably represented his ill-used country in England, should not have been able to get our Government to say one "English" word in favour of Article V. is not surprising. Diplomacy could hardly expect to succeed where the well-deserved popularity and the fascinating charm of our Princess had proved powerless to inspire her adopted country with a generous move for her native land. Lord Palmerston remarked in a letter to Lord John Russell,* "Family ties have little influence on English politics," and justly so when they stand alone ; but in the particular case of Denmark it would be ludicrous that she should forfeit her legitimate—one might say international—claims, backed as they are by the interests of our country and the sympathies of the nation, simply because the family ties of our rulers happen to add to their weight.

"It often falls in course of common life,
That right long time is overborne of wrong."

But a new era is dawning, the Treaty of June 4th promises to be a return to the great traditions of the past, when Great Britain was looked upon as the universal peacemaker, the protector of treaties,

* E. Ashley, "Life of Viscount Palmerston," vol. ii. p. 250.

right, and justice, and the avenger of international iniquities.

“*Suum cuique.*” This noble motto of the House of Prussia, with which so many wrongs have of late been identified, is deeply engraved on every English heart; and we may confidently trust in the wisdom and initiative of our Premier to select the right moment for a diplomatic crusade in favour of Article V.

Great events are in preparation, and surely it cannot be for the sake of Turkey alone that Lord Beaconsfield has dragged the glorious policy of a Pitt out of our political lumber-room.

LONDON, *September*, 1878.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE.

I.

CHRISTIAN I.

Elected King of Denmark in 1443, and elected Duke of Schleswig, Count of Holstein and Stormarn by the joint States of the Duchy of Schleswig and the Lands and Country of Holstein and Stormarn (see Privileges of March 9th, 1460), at the death of his maternal uncle, *Adolphus of Schaumburg*, in 1460.

JOHN I.

Elected King and Co-Duke of Schleswig and Holstein (this latter created a Dukedom by the Emperor Frederic III.)

FREDERIC I.

Elected Co-Duke, and elected likewise, thanks to his mother, Duchess of Brandenburg, in 1525, King of Denmark, re-uniting at the same time again Schleswig, Holstein, and Stormarn in his hands.

CHRISTIAN II.

Elected King and Co-Duke of Schleswig and Holstein; deposed in 1535, and succeeded by his uncle Frederic I.

CHRISTIAN III.

Elected King and Co-Duke; introduces the Lutheran religion.

JOHN THE ELDER.

Elected Co-Duke; died without issue, his nephew, the King-Duke Frederic II. and his brother Adolphus dividing his part called the Hadersleben share.

ADOLPHUS.

Elected Co-Duke, although retaining the Danish Crown; founder of the line of Gottorp.

FREDERIC II.

Elected King and Co-Duke; founder of the Royal or Glucksstadt line.

JOHN THE YOUNGER.

Co-Duke; renounces his sovereign rights in 1564 in favour of his brother and uncle, as the States, assembled in Flensburg, opposed a further division.

CHRISTIAN IV.

Elected King and Co-Duke.

FREDERIC III.

Elected King and Co-Duke; changed in 1660 the Electoral Membership into an Hereditary one; Schleswig having, with consent of Parliament, been declared Sovereign in 1658.

CHRISTIAN V.

Elected Co-Duke; proclaimed the *Lex Regia*.

FREDERIC IV.

Re-unites in 1713 his or the Royal part of Schleswig and the conquered Gottorp part.

CHRISTIAN VI.

Duke of Schleswig and Co-Duke in Holstein only.

FREDERIC V.

Co-Duke in Holstein; husband of the Princess Louisa, dau. of our George II.

CHRISTIAN VII.

Co-Duke in Holstein; husband of the unfortunate Queen Matilda, sister of George III. Resigns his, or the Royal part of Holstein, and the Gottorp part by exchange.

FREDERIC VI.

Reigns in 1784 and King in 1808.

CHRISTIAN VIII.

FREDERIC VII.

The last of the Royal or Glucksstadt line.

CHRISTIAN, Without issue.

ALEXANDER, Founder of the line of Soud.-Sonderburg.

FREDERIC, Founder of the line of Soud.-Nordborg, extinct 1722.

PHILIP, Founder of the line of Soud.-Glücksburg, extinct 1779.

JOACHIM ERNST, Founder of the line of Soud.-Pisa, extinct 1761.

FREDERIC, without issue.

PHILIPP, without issue.

JOHN ADOLPHUS, Elected Co-Duke.

FREDERIC III., Elected Co-Duke.

CHRISTIAN ALBERT, Co-Duke.

ERNEST GUNTHER, Founder of the line of Sonderburg-Augustenburg.

AUGUSTUS PHILIP, Founder of the line of Sonderburg-Rock, since 1825 styled Sonderburg-Glücksburg.

FOUR OTHER SONS, Founders of the lines of Frankschagen, Wissemburg, and the so-called Calbe or Alsenburg line, which all become extinct in the 18th century.

CHARLES FREDERIC, Co-Duke; married Anna, eldest daughter of the Emperor, Peter the Great; lost in 1721 definitely his share of Schleswig, after having been reinstated in 1720 in his share of Holstein.

Emperor Peter III. of Russia (CHARLES PETER ULRICH), husband of CATHERINE II., Co-Duke of Holstein, refused renouncing his rights on Schleswig and his share of Holstein.

EMPEROR PAUL I., Co-Duke of Holstein, confirmed in 1772 the previous treaty of April 11—22, 1767, by which his mother renounced in his name all rights on Schleswig, exchanging his part of Holstein against Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, with which he endowed the younger branch of Gottorp (the Oldenburg line).

ADOLPHUS FREDERIC, Founder of the line of Lübeck (the Swedish line), King of Sweden in 1751; renounces the rights of the younger branch of Gottorp on Schleswig and Holstein, in favour of Christian VII., King of Denmark, and his male descendants.

FREDERIC AUGUSTUS, Duke of Oldenburg.

GEORGE LEONARD, Duke of Oldenburg.

PETER FREDERIC WILLIAM, without issue.

PETER FREDERIC LEONARD, without issue.

GEORGE IV., Abolished in 1818.

GEORGE IV., Abolished in 1818.

PAUL FREDERIC, First Grand Duke of Oldenburg.

CHARLES.

ALEXANDER I.

NICHOLAS I.

CHRISTIAN IX.

(11th son of Charles), Founder of the present Royal line, succeeded by virtue of the Protocol of London, and according to the law of succession of July 26th, 1853.

ALEXANDER II.

Emperor of Russia.

PRINZ OF WASA.

Austrian Field Marshal Lieutenant and father of the Queen of Saxony; d. without male issue in 1873.

PETER FREDERIC.

Grand Duke of Oldenburg.

Sonderburg-Glücksburg lines.

Younger lines of Gottorp.

The Royal or Glucksstadt line (extinct).

Sonderburg-Augustenburg line.

Elder line of Soud.-Glücksburg.


Younger line of Soud.-Glücksburg. The present Royal line.

The Imperial Russian or Elder line of Gottorp.

Formerly Royal Swedish line (extinct).

Grand Ducal Oldenburg line.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE. II.



DIPLOMATIC SKETCHES.

BY

“AN OUTSIDER.”

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

“ ‘Diplomatic Sketches by an Outsider,’ is a series that promises remarkably well. . . . Those who would like to get the run of European politics, could not do better than read him.”—*London*.

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“Should this rather formidable undertaking be executed in its entirety, with the same ability and thoroughness as are found in the present volume, the series will form a very valuable addition to the politician’s library. The author possesses a singularly happy style for the work he has taken in hand,—his writing sometimes reaching to real brilliancy.”—*Globe*.

“There is much that is exceedingly valuable and entertaining in the first of a series of ‘Diplomatic Sketches by an Outsider.’ . . . We are very confident that though the author may be an outsider always, he is not an outsider now.”—*World*.

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